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1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1 Since 1990, there have been major changes to longstanding patterns of intra-
regional labour migration within the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC).  At the same time, new channels of migration to and from the region have 
opened.  Labour migration is now more voluminous, dynamic and complex than it 
has ever been.  This presents policy-makers with considerable opportunities and 
challenges.  In order to understand the exact nature of these challenges, it is 
important to have a good grasp of current labour migration characteristics and 
trends.  Unfortunately, reliable, accurate and comprehensive data on labour 
migration is not available.  The quality and currency of data varies considerably 
from country to country.  A regional labour migration observatory would make the 
future writing of an overview of migration trends a much easier task.   
 
1.2 The primary objectives of this overview of labour migration trends and 
policy implications is fourfold: (a) to review recent characteristics and trends in 
labour migration within and from the SADC region.  Official statistics as well as 
recent survey data are drawn on to generate an overall picture of current 
characteristics and trends in the region;  (b) to highlight some of the critical and 
urgent issues pertaining to labour migration in the region;  (c) to discuss the main 
features of labour migration strategies and policies and legislative and regulatory 
frameworks in countries covered by the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC); and (d) to review the prospects for the freer circulation of migrant labour in 
the Southern African region. 
 
1.3 This brief focuses primarily on the period since 1990 and restructuring of 
labour migration in the wake of the collapse of apartheid, new global migration 
forces, the end of the wars in Mozambique and Angola and the current economic 
and political situation in Zimbabwe.  Although the brief provides an overview of the 
region as a whole, the report concentrates on the major labour migration channels 
in the region (from countries such as Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique and 
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Zimbabwe to South Africa).  The report also considers the nature and implications of 
new migrant movements to and from SADC. 
 
2.0 Contemporary Migration  
 
2.1. Migration Trends and Volumes 
 
2.1.1 Southern Africa has a long history of migration, dating back to the mid-
nineteenth century.1  For much of the twentieth century, the region experienced two 
major forms of labour migration:  (a) in-migration of white immigrants primarily 
from Europe; and (b) intra-regional migration of temporary migrant workers 
(primarily male) from one country in the region to another.   
 
2.1.2 A survey of a sample of 30,000 migrants from five SADC countries conducted 
by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) in 2005 showed that 23% of 
migrants had grandparents who had gone to work in another country, and 57% had 
parents who had done so (Table 1).  Lesotho’s figures were the highest (44% of 
grandparents and 76% of parents) but all of the other country’s migrants showed 
significant numbers of grandparents, and particularly parents, who had also 
migrated for work across borders.2    
 
2.1.3 Since 1990, migration within SADC and from the rest of Africa to SADC has 
increased dramatically.  One very rough approximation of numbers is contained in 
UN data for “migrant stock” (defined as the number of foreign-born people in a 
country at the time of the most recent census).3   According to the UN, the total 
African migrant stock of SADC was 3.4 million people in 2000.  Of these, 2.4 million 
(72%) were from other SADC countries and 966,307 (28%) were from the rest of 
Africa (Table 2).     
 
2.1.4 Over 80% of the non-SADC migrant stock was concentrated in only two 
states: Tanzania and the DRC, both with extensive borders with non-SADC countries.   
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Table 1:  Household History of Migration by Country 
Parents worked in another country 
  Botswana Lesotho Mozambique Swaziland Zimbabwe Total 
  N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Yes 254 41.9 828 76.2 609 66.3 519 47.3 138 34.2 2348 57.1 
No 257 42.4 171 15.7 255 27.8 503 45.8 242 60.0 1428 34.7 
Don't know 95 15.7 87 8.0 54 5.9 76 6.9 23 5.7 335 8.1 
Total 606 100 1086 100 918 100 1098 100 403 100 4111 100 
Grandparents worked in another country 
Yes 63 11.0 249 24.4 396 43.9 115 10.5 61 18.5 884 22.6 
No 294 51.5 215 21.1 239 26.5 701 63.8 246 74.8 1695 43.3 
Don't know 214 37.5 555 54.5 267 29.6 282 25.7 22 6.7 1340 34.2 
Total 571 100 1019 100 902 100 1098 100 329 100 3919 100 
Source: SAMP MARS Data Base 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  African Migrant Stock of SADC 
                   SADC           Rest of Africa     Total 
       No.          %           No.          %        No. 
Angola    29,641         90        3,121           10      37,762 
Botswana    51,035         99           622            1         51,657 
DRC    42,177         13    274,864          87    317,041  
Lesotho      4,022         92           370                8        4,392 
Malawi  247,524         98        5,138            2    252,662 
Mauritius         489         58            347          42           836 
Mozambique  230,260         89      28,670           11    258,930 
Namibia  121,655         98        2,943            2    124,598 
Seychelles      3,100         92           257            8        3,357 
South Africa  687,678         94      41,820            6    729,498 
Swaziland    32,368         87        5,042          13      37,410 
Tanzania  295,121         36    533,133          64    828,234 
Zambia  310,560         91      31,010            9    341,570 
Zimbabwe  446,785         92      39,612            8    486,397 
Total 2,502,415         72    966,929          28 3,469,344 
Source: 
http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/global_migrant_origin_database.html 
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In the Tanzanian case, the non-SADC migrants are primarily refugees.  In every 
other SADC country, the non-SADC born population is a small proportion of the total 
African migrant stock (Table 2).  These figures will have changed in the last few 
years but they illustrate that with the exception of Tanzania and the DRC, the vast 
majority of cross-border migration has occurred within the SADC region. 
 
2.1.5 Legal movements of people from country to country within the SADC region 
have grown massively since 1990.  The volume of human traffic at virtually every 
border post throughout the region has increased in the last two decades and will 
probably continue to do so.  Statistics from individual countries need to be compiled 
in a centralized data base to confirm this observation.  However, South African data 
provides a good indication of the magnitude of change.  The total number of legal 
entrants into South Africa increased from 1 million in 1990 to 5.1 million in 1996 
and over 9 million in 2008 (Figure 1).  The number from the rest of Africa rose from 
less than a million in 1990 to 3.8 million in 1996 and 7.4 million in 2008.  In 2008, 
three quarters of all entrants were from the rest of Africa (up from 55% in 1996) (Table 
3). 
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2.1.7 Since this data on legal entry includes all types of migration, it is important to 
try and determine how many are actually labour migrants (i.e. entering to work or 
to look for work).  In 2008, for example, 9.1 million people said they were entering 
on “holiday” and 186,000 to conduct “business.”  Only 137,000 (1.5%) said they 
were entering to work (up from 94,000 in 2005) (Table 4).  This is certainly an 
under-estimate of the number of labour migrants for two reasons: (a) it does not 
include migrant mineworkers entering on contract (b) it does not include those who 
enter the country as “holidaymakers” with the intention of working. 
Source: Statistics South Africa, Tourism and Migration Reports, PO3051 
Table 3:  Total Migration into South Africa 1996-2008 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2006 2008 
Europe 798,398 981,680 1,048,923 1,273,822 1,343,379 1,312,309 1,412,653 1,443,587 
N. America 144,592 203,065 210,349 222,345 228,244 251,536 309,697 351,158 
C & S America 33,603 46,870 47,348 39,486 41,778 46,625 56,023 65,002 
Australasia 63,793 70,333 71,161 87,136 90,391 93,304 109,754 117,882 
Middle East 25,064 28,570 29,297 34,112 32,860 32,831 38,209 43,714 
Asia 142,240 138,478 156,600 184,555 186,274 195,943 217,396 230,343 
Indian Ocean 11,726 - 14,323 21,004 20,486 17,942 17,047 - 
Africa 3,781,351 4,291,547 4,298,613 4,513,694 4,519,616 4,707,384 6,318,138 7,395,397 
Unspecified 185,454 124,362 123,761 173,522 177,067 156,310 39,371 77,290 
TOTAL 5,186,221 5,898,236 6,000,538 6,549,916 6,640,095 6,815,202 8,518,288 9,724,373 
Source: Statistics South Africa, Tourism & Migration Reports, PS015  
Table 4:  Reason for Entry by Region of Origin, 2008 
 
Holiday Business Work Study Transit 
Border 
Passes 
Other Total 
Africa 6,971,081 116,146 46,787 81,617 24,587 154,999   197 7,395,414 
Europe 1,359,259   39,757 33,630   7,343  2,946        649       3 1,443,587 
N America    331,795     8,464   6,738   3,036     854        271       0    351,158  
Asia    181,179   13,976 28,686   2,901  1,719      1,858     24    230,343 
Australasia    117,435     2,835   1,453      300     315          44       0    122,382  
S America      60,631     1,481   2,014             411     451          14       0      65,002 
Middle East      39,011     2,479   1,505                535     132            22       0       43,684 
Unspecified      20,912        715 16,219 12,910      101               0     20      77,290 
Totals 9,081,303 185,853 137,032 109,053 31,105 184,270 244 9,728,860 
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2.1.8 Other research suggests that the proportion of labour migrants in the total 
cross-border population from within SADC is  higher.  A SAMP survey of migrants in 
five SADC countries in the late 1990s showed, for example, that 29% of all migrants 
were labour migrants (Table 5).4   The proportion varied by country from a low of 
10% (Botswana) to a high of 67% (Mozambique).  Only in Mozambique was labour 
migration the most important reason for entry.  In Botswana, Lesotho and 
Zimbabwe, more people entered to visit family and friends than for any other 
reason.  Business (including informal trading) was easily the most important 
activity for migrants from Botswana and Zimbabwe.   
 
Table 5: Reasons for Entry to South Africa (%) 
Reason for Entry Botswana Lesotho Mozambique Namibia Zimbabwe 
Employment related 
Work 7 17 45 11 15 
Look for work 3 8 22 2 14 
Business related 
Business 6 2 2 8 7 
Buy and sell goods 2 3 2 2 21 
Shopping 24 19 4 1 21 
Other reasons 
Visit family/friends 23 34 12 13 39 
Medical 5 6 4 4 2 
Holiday 14 2 5 19 3 
Study 3 1 1 3 2 
Other 12 8 2 12 3 
Source: SAMP Database 
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2.2 The Decline of Temporary Contract Migration 
 
2.2.1 Contract labour migration is associated with the regional migrant labour 
system to the South African mining industry.   The collapse of apartheid and the 
advent of democracy in South Africa led to many calls to abolish the migrant labour 
system, seen as one of the cornerstones of the apartheid system.5  Critics of the 
system, including the ANC and the NUM, pressured the mining companies to 
stabilize their labour force in family housing and to stop using migrant labour.    
However, the mining companies resisted all pressures to move away from hiring 
migrants and even abandoned plans to expand family housing, citing the cost crisis 
in the industry.6   
 
2.2.2 The new ANC-led government tried to dismantle the migrant labour system 
and atone for the past by offering miners from neighbouring countries permanent 
residence.  The plan was to encourage them to voluntarily “opt out” of migrant 
labour and settle in South Africa.  However, only 50% of eligible miners accepted the 
offer (51,504 in total) and very few of those “opted out” of the system, continuing to 
migrate between the mines and their home countries.7 
 
2.2.3 The cost crisis in gold mining in the 1990s produced significant change to the 
migrant labour system.    The South African gold mining industry entered a long 
period of restructuring and downsizing as a result of declining ore reserves, rising 
costs and a stagnant gold price. Trade union gains for migrants in the mining 
industry in the 1980s were rolled back in the 1990s through sub-contracting. Once 
dominated by a handful of powerful, centralized mining groups, the mining 
companies began to out-source non-production and production functions to a 
growing number of sub-contracting companies. These companies tended to hire 
more vulnerable non-South African workers, particularly from Mozambique and 
Lesotho.  Research shows that the rise of sub-contracting had a marked impact on 
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trade union strength in the mining industry and led to a  decline in wages, job 
security, working conditions and safety.8 
 
2.2.4 At the time of the 1987 Mineworkers' Strike, 477,000 migrant workers were 
employed on the mines. By 2001, the figure was down to only 207,000 (Table 5). 
Retrenchments on this scale exacerbated poverty in many rural mine source areas, 
shutting off remittances to many households and denying young school-leavers the 
chance to migrate to the mines.9  Hardest hit were internal source areas (mainly in 
the Eastern Cape) where the number of migrants fell from 200,000 in 1990 to 
99,000 in 2001.10   The numbers also fell in Botswana (14,000 in 1990 to 3,000 in 
2006), Lesotho (99,000 in 1990 to 45,000 in 2001) and Swaziland (18,000 in 1990 
to 7,000 in 2005).   
 
2.2.5 In contrast to the other source countries, Mozambique was virtually 
unscathed by the job losses of the 1990s.11  There were more Mozambicans 
employed on the mines in 2000 (54,000) than there had been in 1990 (45,000).  The 
proportion of Mozambicans in the workforce increased from 10% to 25% during the 
decade.  The proportion of non-local miners rose from around 40% in the mid-
1980s to nearly 60% in 1997.   The reasons why South African companies 
retrenched everyone except Mozambicans have not been fully explained although 
some sources in the industry say it was because Mozambican workers needed the 
jobs more and were therefore less militant. Others have speculated it was because, 
at the time, rates of HIV and AIDS were lower in Mozambique. 
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Table 6:  Migrant Labour on the South African Gold Mines, 1990-2006 
Year South Africa Botswana Lesotho Mozambique Swaziland % Foreign Total 
1990 199,810 14,609 99,707 44,590 17,757 47 376,473 
1991 182,226 14,028 93,897 47,105 17,393 49 354,649 
1992 166,261 12,781 93,519 50,651 16,273 51 339,485 
1993 149,148 11,904 89,940 50,311 16,153 53 317,456 
1994 142,839 11,099 89,237 56,197 15,892 55 315,264 
1995 122,562 10,961 87,935 55,140 15,304 58 291,902 
1996 122,104 10,477 81,357 55,741 14,371 58 284,050 
1997 108,163 9,385 76,361 55,879 12,960 59 262,748 
1998 97,620 7,752 60,450 51,913 10,336 57 228,071 
1999 99,387 6,413 52,188 46,537 9,307 54 213,832 
2000 99,575 6,494 58,224 57,034 9,360 57 230,687 
2001 99,560 4,763 49,483 45,900 7,841 52 207,547 
2002 116,554 4,227 54,157 51,355 8,698 50 234,991 
2003 113,545 4,204 54,479 53,829 7,970 51 234,027 
2004 121,369 3,924 48,962 48,918 7,598 47 230,771 
2005 133,178 3,264 46,049 46,975 6,993 43 236,459 
2006 164,989 2,992 46,082 46,707 7,124 38 267,894 
Source: TEBA 
 
2.2.6 Since 2000, a rising gold price has led to renewed expansion on the gold 
mines, with the workforce increasing from 207,000 in 2001 to 268,000 in 2006 
(Table 5).  Virtually all of the new (or re-employed) workers have come from inside 
South Africa.  The numbers of non-local labour migrants from all outside source 
countries have continued to fall since 2000 (Figure 2).  Even the numbers from 
Mozambique have started to decline.  The proportion of foreign miners has recently 
fallen from a peak of 59% in 1997 to only 38% in 2006.  
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2.2.7 South African gold mines are thus currently looking to the domestic labour 
market for migrant workers.   This could indicate a new “South Africans-first” policy.    
One of the stated objectives of the Fundamental Principles of the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act (Act 28 of 2002), for example, is to “promote 
employment and advance the social and economic welfare of all South Africans” 
(Section 2(f)). However, the Social and Labour Plan of the Department of Minerals 
and Energy (1999) highlights the need to protect all migrant labour and their 
employment including foreign labour.  This does not mean that new jobs in an 
expanding industry will go to non-local miners. 
 
2.2.8 The other major sector to employ contract migrants is South African 
commercial farming, particularly in the border areas with Mozambique, Zimbabwe 
and Lesotho.12  A study of commercial vegetable farming in the Free State Province 
in the late 1990s showed that farmers recruited (mainly female) workers from 
Lesotho under legal contract through Labour Offices in Lesotho.13  Similar 
arrangements were in place for the hiring of Mozambicans in Mpumalanga and 
Zimbabweans in Northern Province.    
Figure 2: Local and Foreign Migrant Labour,  
1990-2006 
0 
50000 
100000 
150000 
200000 
250000 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
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Total Foreign 
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2.2.9 Since the implementation of the 2002 Immigration Act, commercial farmers 
have been issued with “corporate permits” to legally employ a pre-determined 
number of migrant workers from other countries.   The functioning of the new 
corporate permit system in facilitating legal access by South African employers to 
non-South African semi-skilled and unskilled labour requires further examination. 
 
2.3 The Fall and Rise of Legal Immigration 
 
2.3.1 Immigration from Europe to Southern Africa declined with independence.  In 
the case of South Africa, a declining trend began in the 1980s and continued after 
the collapse of apartheid (Figure 3).  In 1974, there were 50,000 immigrants to 
South Africa; in 1999 there were less than 4,000.  The primary reason for the decline 
in the 1980s was political turbulence which made South Africa an unattractive 
destination for emigrants from Europe.  The primary reason for the continued 
decline after 1994 was post-apartheid immigration policy which actively 
discouraged legal immigration.14 
 
Figure 3: Immigration to South Africa, 1970-2003 
 
 
14 | P a g e  
 
 
2.3.2 Immigration from the rest of Africa remained relatively constant in the 1990s 
(at less than 2,000 per year) (Table 7).  After 2000, it began to rise again, topping 
5,000 in 2004 (a trend that has since continued) (Figure 4).  In other words, in the 
1990s, although immigration was discouraged, immigrants from Africa were 
favoured over those from Europe.  The proportion of immigrants from Africa rose 
from 11% in 1990 to nearly 50% in 2004.   
 
2.2.3 With South Africa’s post-2000 immigration policy focusing on skills-
acquisition, the overall number of immigrants is increasing again (from 3,053 in 
2000 to 10,714 in 2004).  The growing number and proportion of African 
immigrants suggests the beginnings of a skills brain drain to South Africa which 
could accelerate in the future.     
 
  
 
Figure 4: Legal Immigration to South Africa, 1990-2004 
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Table 7: Legal Immigration to South Africa, 1990-2005 
Year    Legal Immigrants   African Immigrants      % 
1990 14,499 1,628 11.2 
1991 12,379 2,065 16.7 
1992 8,686 1,266 14.6 
1993 9,824 1,701 17.3 
1994 6,398 1,628 25.4 
1995 5,064 1,343 26.5 
1996 5,407 1,601 29.6 
1997 4,102 1,281 31.2 
1998 4,371 1,169 26.7 
1999 3,669 980 26.7 
2000 3,053 831 27.2 
2001 4,832 1,584 32.8 
2002 6,545 2,472 37.8 
2003 10,578 4,961 46.9 
2004 10,714 5,235 48.9 
Total 110,121 29,745 27.0 
Source: DHA annual reports; Statistics South Africa Tourism & Migration 
reports, PS015 
 
 
2.3.4 Under political pressure to address South Africa’s chronic unemployment 
problem, the post-apartheid government initially began to reduce temporary work 
permit renewals (from 33,318 in 1992 to 9,191 in 2000) (Table 8).  The issue of new 
permits (primarily to skilled migrants) spiked in 1996 and then went into decline 
(from 19,498 in 1996 to 6,643 in 2000).   Figures from 2001 onwards are 
unavailable but there are indications that the numbers have begun to rise again with 
the recent change in South African immigration policy.  For example, 17,205 new 
work permits were issued in 2006 compared to only 6,643 in 2000.    
 
 
 
 
 
16 | P a g e  
 
Table 8: Work Permits Issued by South Africa, 1990-
2000, 2006 
Year New Work Permits       Renewals        Total 
1990 7,657 30,915 38,571 
1991 4,117 32,763 36,880 
1992 5,581 33,318 38,899 
1993 5,741 30,810 36,551 
1994 8,714 29,352 38,066 
1995 11,053 32,838 43,891 
1996 19,498 33,206 52,704 
1997 11,361 17,129 28,490 
1998 10,828 11,207 22,035 
1999 13,163 10,136 23,299 
2000 6,643 9,191 15,834 
2006 17,205 n/a n/a 
Source: DHA  Annual Reports  
 
2.3.5 The growing significance of Africa as a source region for skilled labour 
migrants can be seen in official entry-for-work statistics.  This data shows that the 
number of people who entered South Africa for “work purposes” declined from 
118,500 in 1996 to a low of 58,747 in 2002 (Table 9).  In the case of Africa, the 
decline was from 53,342 to 16,924.   
 
2.3.6  After the passage of the 2002 Immigration Act, the overall numbers and the 
number from Africa started to rise again from all areas (from 59,000 in 2002 to 
137,000 in 2008 (Figure 5)).   The numbers from the rest of Africa nearly tripled 
from 17,000 to 47,000 between 2002 and 2006.  Also notable is a fourfold increase 
in legal migration from Asia (from 7,000 in 2002 to nearly 29,000 in 2008).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 | P a g e  
 
Table 9:  Legal Entry into South Africa for Work, 1996-2008 
  1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Europe 27,126 31,359 26,392 21,080 25,239 30,771 33,630 
North America 7,375 9,449 8,090 6,070 6,207 6,022 6,738 
Central & S America 1,240 1,470 1,252 1,175 1,329 1,602 2,014 
Australia 1,531 1,847 1,535 1,360 1,294 1,329 1,452 
Middle East 1,081 1,185 818 942 1,185 1,485 1,505 
Asia 8,257 8,279 7,951 7,140 13,952 23,820 28,686 
Indian Ocean Islands 307  371 251 202 279  
Africa 53,342 23,707 17,562 16,924 28,944 42,325 46,787 
Unspecified 18,190 3,871 4,997 3,796 4,912  16,219 
TOTAL 118,449 81,442 68,979 58,747 83,264 114,237 137,032 
 
 
 
        
        
        
        
 
 
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
       
        
        2.3.6 The most important conclusion is that the anticipated “brain drain” of skills 
to post-apartheid South Africa from the rest of Africa did not happen in the 1990s 
because of South Africa’s restrictive immigration policy.  However, the 2002 South 
African Immigration Act (as amended in 2004) and the Joint Initiative for Priority 
Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) suggest that this policy has now changed and that the 
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South African government is making the import of skills a priority.  Work 
opportunities for skilled African labour migrants will undoubtedly increase 
although hiring in some sectors (e.g. health professionals) may continue to be 
limited by the government.  Overall, we are witnessing the beginning of significant 
skills migration to South Africa from the rest of Africa. 
 
2.3.7 The only other SADC country which experienced consistent growth in the 
import of skilled workers in the 1990s was Botswana.15  Economic growth and a 
stable economy attracted skilled workers from other SADC countries and from the 
rest of Africa, as well as Asia and  Europe.  In 2006, Botswana had an estimated 
80,000 legal immigrants in the country and 17,000 skilled migrants spread across 
all sectors of the economy but working primarily in central government, wholesale 
and retail, education and manufacturing (Table 10).   
 
 
Table 10:  Employees by Sector and Citizenship, 
Botswana, September 2006 
 Citizens Non-Citizens 
Agriculture     5,334         295 
Mining and Quarrying   10,928         536 
Manufacturing   32,399      2,134 
Utilities     2,841           15 
Construction   20,866       1,966 
Wholesale and Retail   40,164       2,812  
Hotels and Restaurants   14,431         652 
Transport/Communications   11,139       1,605 
Financial     6,424         195 
Real Estate   15,287      1,631 
Education     6,276      2,528 
Health and Social Work     1,754         472 
Other Community     2,912         229 
Central Government   85,601    14,472 
Local Government   25,447         597 
Total  281,803    16,996 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Botswana 
 
2.3.8 After 2000,  the number of work permits issued by Botswana began to 
decline (Table 11) as the government pursued an active 'localization' policy to 
reduce dependence on expatriates.16  The greatest decline has come in the number 
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of skilled migrants from South Africa, the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe, 
the rest of Africa (except Zimbabwe) and Asia. The number of work permits issued 
to Zimbabweans increased to the point where Zimbabwe is now the most important 
source country for skilled and legal labour migrants to Botswana. 
 
 
Table 11:  Work Permits Issued in Botswana, 2001-2006 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
South Africa 2,365 1,946 1,380 1,308 1,225    824 
Zimbabwe 1,964 1,694 1,177 1,956 3,425 3,165 
Zambia    459    428    321    383    452    324 
Malawi    174    152    109    126    123    100 
Ghana    143    109      64      56       76      75 
Other Africa    744    630    462    559    690    576 
UK    798    664    466     401    320    210 
Other Europe    506    414    309    276    243    143 
India  1,183     992      720    863    903    781 
China     681    513    335    605    786    793 
Other Asia     611    509    363    457    509    502 
Other        -    146    107    112    121      79 
Not Known     174       17           13       25       21       14 
Total  9,802  8,214  5,826  7,127   8,894    7,586 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Botswana 
 
 
2.4 The Growth of Irregular Migration 
 
2.4.1 The number of labour migrants working illegally (without work permits 
and/or appropriate residency status) in any country is difficult to determine.  These 
workers have no interest in making their presence or status known to officials, 
researchers or census-takers and some also carry false documentation.  The media 
and the general public in SADC like to cite numbers of irregular migrants in the 
“millions.”17  However, there is no substantive basis for such claims.   Nevertheless, 
irregular labour migration has undoubtedly increased significantly in the last 
decade and has become a major concern of governments in many SADC states.   
Botswana and South Africa are currently experiencing the greatest influx of 
irregular migrants but many others (including Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia) also have valid concerns about rising irregular 
migration.18   
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2.4.2 The ILO has suggested that it is important for countries to disaggregate 
irregular migration.  One study used the ILO typology in SADC to distinguish 
between (a) lawful and unlawful entry to a country; and (b) lawful and unlawful 
residence in a country (Table 12).19   
 
 
 
Table 12: Typology of Irregular Migration 
 1.  Entry Lawful, 
Stay Lawful 
2. Entry Lawful, 
Stay Unlawful 
3. Entry Unlawful, 
Stay Lawful 
4. Entry 
Unlawful, Stay 
Unlawful 
A. No of 
Migrants 
 Work Permit 
Holders 
 Mine/Farming 
Contracts 
 Retrenched 
Workers who 
Remain 
 Working in 
Different 
Sector 
 Overstayers 
 Forced 
migrants 
(refugees) 
 Immigration 
amnesty 
beneficiaries 
 Border 
jumpers 
 False 
documents 
 Trafficked 
B. No. working  
Illegally 
 Contravening 
Work Permit 
Conditions  
 Holding valid 
visitors 
permit 
 Working in 
Different 
Sector 
 Expired work 
permits 
 Some forced 
migrants 
(refugees) 
 
 Border 
Jumpers 
 False 
Documents 
 Trafficked 
     
 
2.4.3 The most significant increase in irregular labour migration in the last five 
years has been from Zimbabwe.  The numbers of migrants who used to migrate 
from Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia to the commercial farms of Zimbabwe has 
declined considerably since the land transfer programme in Zimbabwe.20  However, 
the number of Zimbabweans migrating to work or to look for work in Botswana and 
South Africa has increased dramatically.  Opportunities for Zimbabweans to work 
legally in other countries are limited but that has not prevented many from 
migrating.  Most of the migrants would classify as B2 or B4 migrants in the above 
typology, although increasing numbers of Zimbabweans are making refugee claims 
(19,000 in South Africa in 2006).    
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2.4.4 Most irregular migrants in SADC are from other countries within the SADC.  
South Africa, for example, has deported over 1.5 million migrants to neighbouring 
countries since 1994 (with Mozambique and Zimbabwe making up 90% of the 
total).   
 
2.4.5 The growth in irregular labour migration within and to SADC has been 
accompanied by growing informalization of migrant labour employment.  Before the 
1990s, most labour migrants were employed in the formal sector of the country of 
destination.  Since 1990, more labour migrants have begun to work in the 
unregulated informal sector (either as owner-operators or as employees of micro-
enterprises and SMME’s).  The numbers of informal sector labour migrants are 
unknown but are increasing as the informal sector expands throughout the region. 
 
 
2.5 The Feminization of Migration 
 
 
2.5.1 Globally, commentators have remarked on the growing feminization of 
labour migration with the absolute numbers of female migrants increasing and 
more women migrating in their own right as independent labour migrants.21  In 
Southern Africa, males still predominate in cross-border migration.   Of the 2001 
SADC-born migrant stock of South Africa, for example, 430,432 (63%) were men 
and 257,246 (37%) were women.  The proportions are similar for migrants from 
African countries.   In a SAMP survey of five SADC countries, over 60% of men but 
only 16% of women had worked in another country, a dramatic difference.22  
  
2.5.2 There is a  definite “feminization” trend to labour migration in Southern 
Africa including (a) an increase in the number and proportion of migrants who are 
female; and (b) a shift in the reasons for women’s migration i.e. more and more 
women becoming independent migrants in their own right. 23   Women in Southern 
Africa are more mobile than ever before.24  However, research shows that there are 
significant gender differences in the purpose of migration between men and women. 
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2.5.3 In the SAMP survey referred to above, migrants in Botswana, Namibia, 
Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe were asked the reason for their most reason 
visit to South Africa.  The survey showed that 50% of male migrants (but only 10% 
of female migrants) had gone to work or look for work.25  A much greater 
proportion of women than men migrated for other reasons: informal trading (10% 
versus 4%), shopping (23% versus 13%) and visiting family and friends (38% 
versus 17%) (Table 13).  As Dodson concludes: “Men and women migrate for 
different reasons.  Men go primarily in search of employment, whereas women’s 
migration is driven by a wide range of social and reproductive factors in addition to 
economic incentives.  Even the economic motives for migration are gender-specific, 
with women going largely to trade and men to work, most in formal employment.  
Thus migration is closely tied to socio-economic roles and responsibilities allocated 
on the basis of gender.”26 
 
2.5.4 Gender differences in male and female migration show up in the timing of 
actual and anticipated migration periods, with males consistently staying away 
longer than women. Gender differences are also apparent in the frequency and 
duration of visits to other countries. Women make more frequent visits but of 
shorter duration than men. Female migrants tend to either be young, single women 
or older, married women whereas male migrants come from a wide range of age 
groups and all marital status categories.   
 
2.5.5 The Southern African labour market is highly stratified by gender which 
provides very different incentives and opportunities for labour migration by males 
and females. For example, for many years the only legal way for a non-professional 
SADC citizen to work in South Africa was in the mining industry. Yet, 99 percent of 
mine employees are male. There is no equivalent employment sector for women in 
which there is comparable ease of entry. 
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Table 13: SADC Gender Differences in Reasons for 
Migration  
Purpose of Most Recent Visit: Males Females 
Employment related   
Work 33 7 
Look for work 17 3 
Other work related   
Business 3 3 
Buy and sell goods 4 10 
Other reasons   
Shopping 13 23 
Visit family/friends 17 38 
Holiday 3 3 
Medical 2 8 
Other 8 5 
Worked in SA at some point 63 16 
Source: SAMP database 
 
2.5.6 The feminization of poverty in many countries has prompted female 
household heads and other members to seek work through migration. This process 
coincides with a growing preference among employers for female workers.  Farmers 
in border areas prefer to employ female migrants from neighbouring countries in 
the fields and canning factories.27  There is also evidence that child labour is  
increasing, particularly from Mozambique.   In addition, studies show that when a 
miner is retrenched, he tends to relinquish his career as a migrant and stay home 
and women household members are forced to migrate for work in other low-wage 
sectors.28   
 
2.6 Forced Migration  
 
2.6.1 Forced migrants are not normally classified as labour migrants.  However, 
the distinction is sometimes blurry in practice.  In some SADC countries, for 
example, successful refugee claimants are allowed to work, making them de facto 
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labour migrants.  Labour migrants sometimes attempt to use refugee protection 
systems to access other countries.  Many have their claims rejected, but not all.   
 
2.6.2 Between 1994 and 2004 around 150,000 refugee applications were received 
by the Southern African Department of Home Affairs (Table 14). In the same decade 
only 26,900 were granted refugee status.   Angola and the DRC accounted for a 
quarter of refugee claims lodged in South Africa between 1994 and 2004.  Since the 
end of the war in Angola, the number of applications has declined while DRC 
remains a major source (the third most significant source in 2006 with 5,582 
applications). 
 
2.6.3 The major change since 2000 has been the dramatic increase in the number 
of applications lodged by migrants from Zimbabwe and Malawi.  In 2006, Zimbabwe 
was the leading country of refugee claimants in South Africa (18,973 or 35% of all 
applications) followed by Malawi (6,377 or 12%) and the DRC (5,582 or 11%).  The 
only other SADC country whose migrants are making a significant number of claims 
is Tanzania.  The unanswered question is how many of these claimants are genuine 
refugees and how many are labour migrants using the asylum and refugee system.  
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Table 14:  Refugee Applications in South Africa by 
Country of Origin, 1994-2004 
Country Applications 
 Number % 
Africa   
DRC* 24 808 15.7 
Angola* 12 192 7.7 
Somalia 14 998 9.5 
Nigeria 12 219 7.7 
Kenya 10 553 6.7 
Zimbabwe* 6 857 4.3 
Ethiopia 6 537 4.1 
Tanzania* 4 821 3.1 
Senegal 4 724 3.0 
Burundi 4 570 2.9 
Congo-Brazzaville 3 823 2.4 
Malawi* 2 765 1.8 
Rwanda 2 167 1.4 
Ghana 2 114 1.3 
Cameroon 2 011 1.3 
Ivory Coast 1 006 0.6 
Asia   
Pakistan 12 576 8.0 
India 10 472 6.6 
Bangladesh 4 173 2.6 
China 2 846 1.8 
Bulgaria 1 616 1.0 
Others 10 098 6.4 
Total 157 946 100 
Source: DHA     * = SADC Countries 
 
 
 
2.7 International Student Migration 
 
2.7.1 Although not strictly a form of labour migration, international student 
migration is included in this review for several reasons.  First, international student 
migration within the SADC has increased considerably since 1994.29  Secondly, 
many students work while they are studying in other countries.  Thirdly, student 
migration often turns into temporary or permanent labour migration as graduates 
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seek employment in the countries in which they studied.  Fourthly, recent surveys 
show that many SADC students do not intend to remain in their home countries 
after graduation but to seek work elsewhere in the region or outside it.30 
 
2.7.2 South Africa is the primary destination for students in the region, although 
students from other SADC countries are also to be found in most other SADC 
countries.  The SADC Education Protocol has made it much easier for students from 
other SADC countries to attend institutions of higher learning in other countries 
(Table 15).  The total number of international students registered at South African 
universities rose from 12,500 in 1994 to nearly 53,000 in 2005.  The majority (68%) 
are from SADC countries. 
 
 
 
Table 15: International Students at South African Public Universities, 2005 
Region Number % 
Southern Africa 35,725 68 
Rest of Africa 7,586 14 
Rest of the World 7,913 15 
No Info 1,479 3 
Totals 52,703 100 
Source: SA Department of Education 
 
2.7.3 More research is needed on what international student migrants do after 
graduation.  However, research has been conducted on what students who are 
educated in their own countries intend to do once they have graduated.  SAMP’s 
Potential Skills Base Survey, conduced in 2002, interviewed 10,000 final-year 
students at universities and colleges in 6 SADC countries about their migration 
intentions on graduation.31  As Table 16 shows, 45% of students have given moving 
to another country upon graduation a “great deal” of consideration (with 
Zimbabwean students the highest at 71% and Namibia the lowest at 29%).  As many 
as 36% said they would probably leave within 6 months of graduation and 53% 
within 5 years of graduation (with Zimbabwean students again reporting the 
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highest propensity to leave).  The majority of SADC students felt that they would 
move to South Africa, although South African and Zimbabwean students displayed a 
strong inclination to leave the region altogether.  In other words, migration 
potential amongst new graduates is extremely high within Southern Africa. 
 
Table 16: Likelihood of Emigration After Graduation (%) 
 South Africa Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Swaziland Lesotho Ave. 
Likelihood 
of moving 
       
Six months 
after 
graduation 
36.5 28.5 21.0 56.2 31.3 37.1 35.5 
Two years 
after 
graduation 
48.2 47.4 39.8 70.0 55.3 55.1 52.1 
Five years 
after 
graduation 
47.6 58.1 49.8 59.5 58.7 50.3 53.2 
 
 
2.8 Skilled Labour Migration and the Brain Drain 
 
2.8.1 Official emigration statistics do not capture the full dimensions of the brain 
drain from SADC countries.   Statistics South Africa, for example, recorded a total of 
92,612 people (including 20,038 with professional qualifications) emigrating 
between 1989 and 2003 to five main destination countries.  However, destination-
country statistics of immigrant arrivals from South Africa show 80,831 
professionals and 368,829 total immigrants arriving from South Africa during the 
same time period.32   Official statistics therefore undercounted the loss by around 
three-quarters.   
 
2.8.2 The sector most impacted by the brain drain is health.   A recent study by the 
Centre for Global Development shows that in 2000, nearly 30% (17,000 out of 
57,000) of SADC-born physicians were resident outside their country of birth (Table 
17).33  The greatest number of locally-born physicians residing abroad were from 
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South Africa (7,363 or one in five), followed by Angola (2,102), Zimbabwe (1,602), 
Tanzania (1,356) and Mozambique (1,334).  The numbers of Zimbabwean-born 
physicians outside the country has undoubtedly increased considerably since 2000.   
 
2.8.3 The major destinations for SADC physicians include the United Kingdom 
(5,930), Portugal (3,347), the USA (2,799), Canada (2,100) and Australia (1,365).   In 
a significant number of cases there are more locally born physicians residing 
outside their country than in it.  They include Mozambique (75%), Angola (70%), 
Malawi (59%), Zambia (57%), Tanzania (52%) and Zimbabwe (51%).     
 
Table 17: Number of SADC-Born Physicians Residing Abroad 
                                                             Destination Country 
Origin 
Country: 
H 
O 
M 
E 
 
A 
B 
R 
O 
A 
D 
 
U 
K 
 
 
U 
S 
A 
 
 
 
F 
R 
A 
N 
C 
E 
 
C 
A 
N 
A 
D 
A 
 
A 
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S 
T 
R 
A 
L 
I 
A 
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O 
R 
T 
U 
G 
A 
L 
 
S 
P 
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I 
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B 
E 
L 
G 
I 
U 
M 
 
S 
 
A 
F 
R 
I 
C 
A 
 
% 
A 
B 
R 
O 
A 
D 
 
 
Angola 881 2,102 16 0 5 25 0 2,006 14 5 31 70% 
Botswana 530 68 28 10 0 0 3 0 0 1 26 11% 
DRC 5,647 552 37 90 139 35 0 42 4 107 98 9% 
Lesotho 114 57 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 33% 
Malawi 200 293 191 40 0 0 10 2 1 1 48 59% 
Mauritius 960 822 294 35 307 110 36 1 0 20 19 46% 
Mozambique 435 1,334 16 20 0 10 3 1,218 4 2 61 75% 
Namibia 466 382 37 15 0 30 9 0 0 0 291 45% 
Seychelles 120 50 29 0 4 10 3 0 0 0 4 29% 
South Africa 27,551 7,363 3,509 1,950 16 1,545 1,111 61 5 0 0 21% 
Swaziland 133 53 4 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 44 28% 
Tanzania 1,264 1,356 743 270 4 240 54 1 1 3 40 52% 
Zambia 670 883 465 130 0 40 39 3 0 3 203 57% 
Zimbabwe 1,530 1,602 553 235 0 55 97 12 1 6 643 51% 
TOTAL 40,501 16,917 5,930 2,799 475 2,100 1,365 3,347 30 148 1,557 29% 
Source: Clemens “Medical Leave.”  
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2.8.4 Approximately 10% of SADC-born nurses were outside their country of birth 
in 2000 (Table 18). The greatest number of nurses abroad were from South Africa 
(4,844), followed by Mauritius (4,531), Zimbabwe (3,723), the DRC (2,288) and 
Angola (1,841).  On a proportional basis, the countries most affected are Mauritius 
(63% of nurses abroad), the Seychelles (29%), Zimbabwe (24%), Mozambique 
(19%) and Malawi (17%).  In Zimbabwe, for example, Chikanda recently concluded 
that “most of the country’s public health systems are grossly understaffed and the 
skeletal staff remaining is reeling under heavy workloads."34 
 
Table 18:  Number of SADC-Born Nurses Residing Abroad 
                                                                     Destination Country 
Origin 
Country: 
H 
O 
M 
E 
 
A 
B 
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O 
A 
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S 
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I 
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A 
 
% 
A 
B 
R 
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A 
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Angola 13,135 1,841 22 135 12 10 4 1,639 8 11 0 12% 
Botswana 3,556 80 47 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2% 
DRC 16,969 2,288 44 207 206 50 0 9 4 1,761 7 12% 
Lesotho 1,266 36 5 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 3% 
Malawi 1,871 377 171 171 0 10 14 0 0 0 11 17% 
Mauritius 2,629 4,531 4,042 107 86 75 195 1 0 22 3 63% 
Mozambique 3,664 853 12 64 0 10 0 748 2 6 11 19% 
Namibia 2,654 152 18 6 0 0 4 1 0 6 118 5% 
Seychelles 422 175 80 28 8 30 29 0 0 0 0 29% 
South Africa 90,986 4,844 2,884 877 20 275 955 58 3 33 0 5% 
Swaziland 3,345 96 21 36 0 10 4 0 0 0 25 3% 
Tanzania 26,023 953 446 228 0 240 32 2 1 0 4 4% 
Zambia 10,987 1,110 664 299 0 25 68 2 0 0 52 9% 
Zimbabwe 11,640 3,723 2,834 440 0 35 219 14 3 0 178 24% 
TOTAL 189,147  21,059  
11,290 2,632 332 770 
1,52
4 
2,474 21 1,839 439 10% 
Source: Clemens, “Medical Leave.” 
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2.8.5 South Africa stands to benefit greatly from the exodus of health professionals 
from other African countries.  In 2000, South Africa had 1,557 physicians and 439 
nurses from other SADC countries.  To date, the African brain drain to South Africa 
has been slowed by South Africa’s post-1994 immigration policy which, until 
recently, did not favour the importation of skills.35  Although that has now changed, 
the South African government maintains that it will not do what it criticizes 
developed countries for doing i.e. poaching health professionals from African 
countries.   
 
 2.9 Employment Sectors of  Labour Migrants 
 
2.9.1 In 2004, SAMP conducted a five-nation survey of migration, poverty and 
remittances (Migration and Remittances survey or MARS).36  MARS interviewed a 
nationally-representative sample of migrant-sending households in Botswana, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.  The survey collected information 
on over 30,000 individual migrants, including occupational data.  A complete 
occupational breakdown of the sample is provided by country in Table 19. 
 
Table 19:   Migrant Occupations in 5 SADC Countries 
 Botswana Lesotho Mozambique Swaziland Zimbabwe Total 
Main Occupation N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Farmer 7 1.1 3 .3 1 .1 5 .4 6 .7 22 .5 
Agricultural 
worker (paid) 
1 .2 21 2.0 22 2.2 6 .5 10 1.2 60 1.3 
Agricultural 
worker (unpaid) 
0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 1 .1 1 .0 
Service worker 7 1.1 12 1.1 12 1.2 28 2.5 85 9.9 144 3.1 
Domestic worker 11 1.7 97 9.0 9 .9 18 1.6 16 1.9 151 3.2 
Managerial office 
worker 
2 .3 2 .2 0 .0 9 .8 30 3.5 43 .9 
Office worker 7 1.1 3 .3 4 .4 19 1.7 39 4.6 72 1.5 
Foreman 4 .6 1 .1 5 .5 8 .7 4 .5 22 .5 
Mine worker 552 87.2 736 68.4 301 30.5 705 62.3 26 3.0 2320 49.5 
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Skilled manual 
worker 
5 .8 67 6.2 79 8.0 69 6.1 42 4.9 262 5.6 
Unskilled manual 
worker 
3 .5 16 1.5 94 9.5 88 7.8 18 2.1 219 4.7 
Informal sector 
producer 
1 .2 30 2.8 8 .8 5 .4 41 4.8 85 1.8 
Trader/ hawker/ 
vendor 
0 .0 21 2.0 59 6.0 8 .7 126 14.7 214 4.6 
Security personnel 0 .0 2 .2 5 .5 22 1.9 1 .1 30 .6 
Police/ Military 1 .2 0 .0 1 .1 2 .2 3 .4 7 .1 
Businessman/ 
woman (self-
employed) 
4 .6 13 1.2 39 4.0 12 1.1 36 4.2 104 2.2 
Employer/ 
Manager 
0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 4 .4 11 1.3 15 .3 
Professional 
worker 
10 1.6 31 2.9 17 1.7 40 3.5 126 14.7 224 4.8 
Teacher 0 .0 1 .1 1 .1 9 .8 60 7.0 71 1.5 
Health worker 4 .6 3 .3 3 .3 6 .5 91 10.6 107 2.3 
Pensioner 1 .2 1 .1 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 2 .0 
Scholar/ Student 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 1 .1 11 1.3 12 .3 
House work 
(unpaid) 
0 .0 0 .0 1 .1 0 .0 0 .0 1 .0 
Unemployed/ Job 
seeker 
1 .2 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 1 .0 
Other 5 .8 0 .0 167 16.9 49 4.3 25 2.9 246 5.3 
Shepherd 0 .0 5 .5 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 5 .1 
Don't know 7 1.1 11 1.0 159 16.1 19 1.7 49 5.7 245 5.2 
Total 633 100.0 1076 100.0 987 100.0 1132 100.0 857 100.0 4685 100.0 
 
2.9.2 The occupational data shows the following: 
 Mining remains the largest employer of labour migrants from these countries 
(49.5%) followed by skilled manual workers (5.6%), professionals (4.8%) and 
unskilled manual labourers (4.7%). 
 The informalization of migrant labour is evident in that 6.4% of migrants 
worked in the informal sector and another 2.2% said they were self-employed 
business people.  
32 | P a g e  
 
 The proportion of commercial farmworkers is relatively low (1.8%). 
 Other sectors in which over 1% of the migrants are employed include domestic 
work (3.2%), the service sector (3.1%), the health sector (2.3%), teaching 
(1.5%) and clerical work (1.5%). 
 Botswana, Lesotho Swaziland and Mozambique (at over 50%) in each case are 
clearly dominated by mine migration (to South Africa).  In the Zimbabwean case, 
mining (at 3%) was relatively insignificant. 
 Very few labour migrants appear to leave Botswana for work other than in 
mining and these numbers are declining. 
 In the case of Lesotho, while 68% of migrants are miners, retrenchments have 
diversified the sources of employment (as well as encouraging more women to 
migrate).  As many as 9% are domestic workers and 6% are skilled manual 
workers.   
 Mozambican labour migrants are employed in a large array of unskilled and 
semi-skilled professions. After mining (at 30.5%) comes unskilled manual work 
(9%), skilled manual work (8%) and trading and hawking (6%). 
 Zimbabwean labour migrants are employed in an even greater variety of 
occupations.  The single most significant category is informal work and self-
employment (at 23.7%), followed by professionals (14.7%), health workers 
(10.6%), service workers (9.9%), teachers (7.0%), skilled manual workers 
(4.9%) and office workers (4.6%). 
 
2.9.3 Two things set the Zimbabwean migrant profile apart from that of the other 
countries: (a) only 30% of the migrants work in South Africa compared with over 
90% for all the other countries and (b) Zimbabwean migration is dominated by 
skilled and professional people whereas the migrants from the other countries are 
mainly semi-skilled or manual workers.  Zimbabwean migration within SADC is 
dominated by people working in the informal sector and service sector. 
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 3.0 Major Issues Pertaining to Labour Migration in Southern Africa 
 
3.1 Data Deficiencies 
 
3.1.1 Our understanding of the dynamics and trends of labour migration within, to 
and from the Southern African region have improved but there are still many gaps.  
Official statistics (which reveal migration patterns and trends) need to be 
triangulated with household surveys (which provide a greater understanding of 
migration causes and dynamics) and private sector data (which provides 
employment information).   
 
3.1.2 Official migration statistics are of relatively good quality in some SADC 
countries (e.g. Botswana and South Africa) but not in others.  However, even in the 
South African case, there are serious undercounting problems in relation to the 
brain drain.  Not only are there large data gaps but where the data does exist, it is 
not often accessible on a regional scale.   
 
3.1.3 A recent report for the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) 
investigated the migration data systems for all SADC states and recommended 
harmonization of migration data collection.37  Information was collected from 11 
SADC states on four key issues: (a) Collection and storage of data; (b) Processing 
and analysis of data; (c) Accessibility of data/availability of statistics; and (d) 
Categories of data. 
 
3.1.3 The study found that there is significant overlap between the systems 
currently in place in the various SADC member states and there is also substantial 
interest in developing some form of shared or at least compatible system. The key to 
data harmonisation is to ensure that all member states collect the same information 
about persons travelling through their ports of entry by designing and 
implementing  SADC-wide arrivals and departure cards that are used by all member 
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states. This means that all states will collect the exact same information about 
travellers passing through their ports of entry, which then makes it easier to 
compare data between countries. 
3.1.5 Most countries already have designated storage facilities for entry and exit 
cards that are collected. However, there are inconsistencies in terms of whether the 
designated storage facility is just an empty room in an office building, or whether it 
is part of a formal archival system. There are also inconsistencies in terms of the 
length of time these cards are stored before being destroyed. 
3.1.6 Most countries do not have the resources to migrate from a manual system to 
an electronic system and, to complicate matters further, those countries that have 
invested in electronic systems are not using the same system. An important first 
step would be for member states to initiate a consultation to discuss the possibilities 
and modalities of implementing a uniform electronic data collection and storage 
system.  
3.1.7 The ability of member states to process and analyse migration-related data is 
very uneven. Most member states do this kind of processing at a very basic level by 
producing internal reports that reflect total number of travellers in particular 
categories over a set period of time. Other member states are able to produce very 
substantial statistical information which is then analysed and used for purposes of 
planning and/or reporting.  
3.1.8 For many countries, data collection is largely a matter of routine and the 
extent to which they process and analyse the data collected for policy making is 
limited. A starting point is to collectively clarify the purpose and objectives of data 
processing and analysis and then to think about appropriate systems to put in place 
to achieve these.  
3.1.9 There are no uniform systems in place in the region that guide or determine 
the extent to which migration-related data is publicly available.. The majority of 
member states do not produce comprehensive publicly-available data of the level of 
detail required to understand labour migration patterns and trends. 
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3.1.10 The MIDSA report argues that harmonisation is much more feasible to 
achieve than is commonly believed. However, the argument must be considered that 
harmonisation should not be pursued simply because it is possible to do so.  Instead, 
SADC states need to reflect on the purpose of harmonization and critically think 
about the systems to put in place to achieve this objective. 
3.1.11 As regards complementary research on labour migration, SAMP has 
undertaken the most systematic sectoral research program over the last decade on 
many aspects of labour migration.38  SAMP has specialized in producing policy-
relevant research and disseminating it at the national scale.  However, not all SADC 
countries have been involved in SAMP and the network needs expanding 
throughout the region.  Research also needs to be more closely attuned to the 
information needs of governments, labour and business, particularly when it comes 
to the issue of good labour migration management. 
 
3.2 The Rights of Migrant Workers 
 
3.2.1 Labour migrants in Southern Africa have never enjoyed the same basic rights 
as local workers.  Indeed, many still work in exploitative conditions that do not meet 
minimum national labour standards or the international conventions to which 
countries are party.  Capacity for enforcement is weak in many countries and unions 
have traditionally had problems organizing migrant workers.  This is certainly not a 
problem confined to Southern Africa.     
 
3.2.2 A survey by SAMP showed that most citizens in several SADC countries do 
not believe that labour migrants should enjoy the same rights and legal protections 
as domestic workers.39  However, they do believe that migrants should enjoy more 
rights than refugees.  At the same time, many are probably unaware of the actually 
working conditions of migrants, even though they do receive periodic press 
coverage.    
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3.2.3 A recent study of conditions on Free State farms, for example, concluded: 
“Almost without exception, the farmworkers interviewed testified that they endure 
exploitative employment conditions, including wages below the Minimum Living 
Standard, unhygienic and crowded living conditions, and abusive treatment from 
farmers and supervisors. The mutual mistrust exhibited by Basotho farm labourers 
and Free State farmers undermines productive labour relations; furthermore, the 
farmers' determination to deny their labour force basic rights and freedom of 
movement often results in abusive treatment.”40  It would be incorrect to infer that 
all employers treat their workers in this manner but other studies have also shown 
the poor working conditions and lack of protection enjoyed by migrants in other 
sectors where organization has been difficult or slow – domestic service, 
commercial agriculture and construction. 
 
3.2.4 Both the AU and the UN have called on all countries to ratify the UN 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families.  This important Convention, which lays down a basic framework of 
rights and protections for migrant workers, has now been ratified by 37 countries.  
None of these are developed countries and only two (Lesotho and Seychelles) are in 
the SADC.   
 
3.2.5 A study by SAMP and UNESCO is examining the obstacles and challenges to 
ratification in SADC.  The first study in this project focused on South Africa.41  The 
South Africa report examines the reasons why some countries are reluctant to ratify 
and then looks specifically at the position of SA stakeholders, based on extensive 
interviews with key informants in government, the private sector and the labour 
unions.  The report found that the applicable labour and related policies, laws and 
regulations of post-apartheid South Africa are not actually inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Convention.   If anything, there is a close correlation between what 
the Convention tries to achieve and what South African law provides for.   
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3.2.6 All key informants agreed that South Africa’s labour legislation applies 
equally to migrant workers and to nationals, and that no distinction or denial of 
rights can be instituted on the basis of nationality or citizenship. Most also thought a 
distinction should be made between documented and undocumented migrants.  But 
some, particularly the  the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), were adamant that once a person had 
been employed, they should be entitled to the full protection of South Africa’s labour 
legislation, irrespective of their legal status. As one noted - ‘a worker, is a worker, is 
a worker.’ In this respect, it is not just South Africa’s labour law that is applicable, 
but also the Constitution, which outlaws discrimination on the basis of nationality or 
origin. 
 
3.2.7 One of the biggest obstacles to ratification of the Convention is its limited 
visibility. That could well prove true of other SADC countries as well.  The 
Convention has never been formally tabled or discussed and familiarity with it is 
limited to a few individuals in government who may have had the opportunity to 
participate in international forums where the Convention had been discussed.  
COSATU suggested that as a first step towards ratification, a broad-based awareness 
programme or campaign could be conducted to explain the origin, purpose and 
contents of the Convention. 
 
3.2.8 Another way to promote ratification would be to position the Convention in 
the context of the Southern African (SADC) sub-regional agenda.  Considering the 
Convention’s emphasis on the entire process of migration and its provisions on 
collaboration, it would be extremely difficult for a country in Southern Africa to 
effectively implement the Convention on its own. Ratification on a regional scale 
would serve as a mechanism through which Southern African countries could hold 
each other accountable to the obligations of the Convention. Existing agreements 
such as the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons and the Social 
Charter on the Fundamental Rights of Workers could serve as a foundation for this 
cooperation and enforcement.  
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3.3 Managing Irregular Labour Migration 
 
3.3.1 Irregular migration is seen by many governments as a significant and 
growing problem in SADC.  Not all labour migrants are in irregular status but 
increasing numbers are.  This is leading to significant problems of migration 
management in many SADC destination countries.   General problems caused by 
uncontrolled irregular labour migration include: 
 Undermining of respect for national sovereignty, the integrity of borders, legal 
channels of border crossing and the right of states to determine who will enter 
their territory and not. 
 Lack of respect for the rule of law. 
 Trafficking and human smuggling across borders leads to significant abuse and 
exploitation of desperate migrants. 
 Widespread corruption at borders and amongst enforcement agents.  Migrants 
do “deals” with corrupt officials and police to obtain false documentation or pay 
bribes in order to avoid arrest and deportation.42  
 Exploitation by employers of vulnerable migrants who are afraid of reporting 
violations of their rights to the authorities. 
 Undermining labour legislation as irregular migrants are used to undercut local 
workers and collective agreements 
 The high cost of enforcement including arrest, detention and (largely ineffectual) 
deportation. 
 Growing hostility and resentment towards migrants leading to violence against 
migrants, including those (such as refugees) who are legally in a country 
 
3.3.2 A number of key questions arise in the debate about how to reduce irregular 
migration and its negative impacts: 
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 Should irregular labour migrants enjoy all the rights and privileges of other 
workers or does their questionable legal status disqualify them from such 
access? 
 How effective are current systems of enforcement?  Does the deportation of 
labour migrants (particularly to neighbouring SADC countries actually have the 
desired effect or is it counter-productive? 
 Why does enforcement generally focus on migrants and not their employers?  
Would employer sanctions be a better option?  Or, as some maintain, would it be 
better to concentrate on reducing the incentive to employ irregular migrants by 
enforcing labour law and standards? 
 How can states deal with ground-level corruption amongst their own officials 
and police?  How can states deal more effectively with trafficking and smuggling? 
 How can states discourage the abuse of refugee protection systems by irregular 
migrants and avoid clogging up refugee determination processes?  
 Should states offer “amnesties” and/or legalization for irregular migrants?  
South Africa offered three such amnesties in the 1990s which had a positive 
impact.    
 
3.3.3 This set of discussion points questions are largely reactive strategies to 
existing irregular migration.  Several proactive policy options have also been 
suggested.  Three in particular need to be discussed: 
 
 Improved Legal Access to Labour Markets.  SAMP research shows that the vast 
majority of migrants would use legal channels of access and employment if 
these were available to them.43   However, few states in SADC, with their own 
problems of domestic unemployment, make it easy for labour migrants from 
other countries to come and work legally.  Even the new South African 
Immigration Act, with its emphasis on recruiting high-level skills from abroad, 
does not make it easy for an employer with the means to hire an individual non-
South African should they wish to do so.  Only the gold mining industry (and 
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some commercial farmers) have ever enjoyed that privilege.  The argument is 
that if policies were in place that made legal migration for employment easier, 
then irregular migration, and all its negative consequences, would be less of a 
problem.   
 Temporary work programmes.  The ILO has provided a guide to global “best 
practice” in the design and implementation of programmes of temporary work 
for employment.44  SADC states might consider the design and implementation 
of such schemes.45     
 Greater freedom of movement between states.  Since over 90% of irregular 
migrants within SADC come from within the region, allowing greater legal 
freedom of movement to seek work within the Community might immediately 
reduce the “problem” of irregular migration to manageable proportions by 
removing the vast majority of irregular migrants.   Enforcement resources could 
then be focused on the smaller number of migrants from outside SADC.  This 
possibility is part of the debate over the Facilitation of Movement Protocol (see 
below). 
 
3.3.4 Xenophobic rhetoric and actions targeted at labour migrants from other 
countries are a significant problem within the SADC, as documented in several 
recent studies.46    Intolerance is greatest in those countries that are the major 
destination countries for migrants (Botswana, Namibia and South Africa).47  While 
much of this discourse is rooted in local fears about job competition and 
competition for scarce resources, xenophobia manifests itself in a whole set of 
myths about other Africans and in criminal actions against migrants (e.g. the recent 
looting and burning of Somali-owned stores and the driving out of Zimbabweans 
from some South African communities).  Political ownership of the problem and 
public and media education are a clear necessity since the media is generally 
fanning the flames of xenophobia.48 
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3.4 Remedying the Brain Drain 
 
3.4.1 One of the major challenges facing all of the states of SADC is the renewed 
brain drain of scarce skills from the region.  Solimano has developed a classification 
of six different brands of talent according to occupational characteristics.49  
 Technical talent in terms of people who are experts in information 
technology, telecommunications, engineering or computer science. This 
particular group of ‘knowledge people’ represent a human capital resource 
base for current production-related activities.  
 Scientists and academics who constitute an important knowledge source for 
countries.  
 Entrepreneurs and managers, an important group seen as often overlooked 
in discussions of talent mobility. Migrant entrepreneurs and managers are 
significant agents for wealth creation.  
 Qualified professionals, such as economists, engineers, heath or 
environmental specialists, who are recruited to assist multilateral and 
regional development banks, international organizations and development 
agencies at global, regional and national scales, constituting an ‘international 
public sector.’  
 Talented cultural workers, including musicians, artists and designers, who 
represent an important resource for the development of creative and cultural 
industries.  
 Health professionals whose international circulation represents a specific 
form of talent outflow that is of considerable concern to developing countries. 
 
3.4.2 The countries of the SADC are impacted by a brain drain in each of these six 
categories.  However, the issue of health professional migration is one which is 
clearly of most concern to most SADC countries at the present time.  Some attempts 
have been made in the health sector to minimize the brain drain of health workers 
and its effects by addressing push and pull factors.  On the push side, SADC 
governments have adopted a number of financial and non-financial incentives to try 
42 | P a g e  
 
to get professionals to stay.  These include improved training and career 
opportunities; social needs support; improved working conditions; better 
management of human resources; greater health and ART access for the public; and 
salary top-ups and allowances.  Table 20 shows that all SADC countries are trying 
some of these measures.  Table 21 provides a more detailed inventory of non-
financial and financial  policies and strategies by country.   The problem is that many 
push factors are non-sector specific e.g. personal and family safety and educational 
opportunities for children. 
 
Table 20:   Remedies for the Health Brain Drain 
 Training 
And career 
path 
Measures 
Social 
needs 
support 
Working 
conditions 
HR and 
personnel 
management 
Systems 
Health 
and ART 
Access 
Financial: 
Salary top-
ups and 
allowances 
Angola   X X  X 
Botswana X  X X X X 
DRC X   X  X 
Lesotho X X X X  X 
Malawi X X X X X X 
Mauritius X  X X  X 
Mozambique X X X X X X 
Namibia X   X  X 
South Africa X  X X X X 
Swaziland X X X X X X 
Tanzania X X  X  X 
Zambia X X X X X X 
Zimbabwe X X X X  X 
Source:  Y. Dambisya, “A Review of Non-Financial Incentives for Health Worker Retention in East and 
Southern Africa”  Equinet Discussion Paper No. 44, Harare, 2007. 
 
 
 
Table 21:  Financial and Non-Financial Incentives for Health Professionals 
Country Non-financial incentives Financial incentives 
Angola Functional Health Information 
System; expansion and 
upgrading of facilities. 
Under-the table payments; 
overtime pay; exposure; 
evening and night subsidies. 
Botswana Performance-based incentives; 
HRH planning with HMIS; 
upgrading of facilities; higher 
training opportunities; 
HIV/AIDS workplace 
programme. 
Reasonable salary; overtime 
pay (higher rates for nurses 
than doctors). 
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DRC Not available. 
Planned: Continuing 
professional development; 
monitoring and evaluation; 
supervision; improved 
communication. 
Dual employment; under-the 
table payments; timely pay; 
performance-based bonuses; 
increased overtime pay. 
Lesotho Accelerated grade policy; 
continuing education; higher 
promotion prospects for rural 
HCW; bonding. 
Proposed: Improvement in 
facilities and equipment; IT 
support; staff housing; staff 
security; transport; support 
centres; sabbatical leave; 
formal job regarding; improved 
career management; better 
posting policy; streamlined 
HRM policies and procedures; 
HRIS. 
Accelerated increment for rural 
workers; overtime and night 
duty allowances; mountain 
allowance; housing subsidy; 
top-up pay for CHAL hospital 
workers. 
Malawi HIV/AIDS policies in the 
workplace; training 
opportunities; improved 
workplace conditions; staff 
rotation; better HRM and 
supplies through SWAP. 
CHAM: Transport for visits and 
shopping; free housing; free 
medical care (private rooms); 
bonding for training. 
Salary top-ups; professional 
allowance; retirement packages 
( earlier for CHAM; more 
generous for government); 
housing allowance; car 
allowance; subsidised utilities; 
access to loans; dual practice; 
CHAM- assistance with school 
fees; medical expenses; 
housing. 
Mauritius Improved workplace; CPD; 
HRIS; decentralisation of 
operational management. 
Reasonable salary; disturbance 
allowance for Rodrigues and 
outer islands; higher pay from 
savings. 
Mozambique 50% bonus when calculating 
length of service for rural staff; 
use of service cars; free 
housing; free food; HRM 
system; HGO initiatives; paid 
and free ART; improved 
communication. 
Proposed: bicycles; 
motorcycles; tea/coffee; greater 
staff rotation; TV and internet 
access; solar panels where 
there is no electricity; 
performance appraisal. 
Dual employment; under –the 
table payments; medical 
assistance fund; salary top-ups; 
housing and fuel subsidies; per 
diems; extra-hours contracts. 
Namibia Job security; career paths and 
training opportunities; 
performance appraisal. 
Reasonable salary; end-of –
service benefits; housing; car 
ownership schemes; medical 
aid. 
South Africa Improved working conditions; 
infrastructure; performance 
appraisal system; career 
Salary increase; scarce skills 
and rural allowance; limited 
dual practice (RWOPS); 
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progression and CPD; 
community service; bonding; 
certificate of need; recreational 
facilities; better HR planning 
and management; medical care 
(GEMS). 
Private Sector: Allows short 
postings abroad. 
sponsorship for education; 
affordable medical insurance.  
Proposed: New remuneration 
structure for HCW. 
Swaziland Proposed by government: 
Better accommodation; 
childcare facilities; provision of 
ART; AIDS care. 
Private Sector: Lower workload; 
many training opportunities; 
supervision; good facilities. 
60% pay rise for HCW; car and 
housing allowances. 
Tanzania Open performance appraisal; 
HRM; HRIS; housing; 
performance-based contract; 
Mkapa fellowships offers skills 
enhancement and alumni 
association membership. 
Differential salary structure for 
HCW compared to other civil 
servants; dual practice; SASE; 
Mkapa Fellowships offer a 
stipend and end-of-service 
bonus. 
Proposed: Rural incentives; 
extend SASE to other HCW. 
Zambia HIV/AIDS treatment for HCW; 
better infrastructure; training 
opportunities; performance-
based contract; staff transport; 
accommodation; electrification; 
support for nurse tutor 
training; trophy and plaque 
awards (pilot study). 
Rural doctors: good salary; 
housing subsidy; hardship 
allowance; children's fees; end-
of-contract bonus; access to 
loans. Salary top-ups- medical 
school staff; bonus for best 
performing and best improved 
health centre in one district 
(pilot study). 
Planned: Extend Incentives 
rural incentives to other HCW. 
Zimbabwe Bonding; training 
opportunities; performance 
management system; recruit 
more HCW to reduce workload; 
improvements in housing and 
working environment. 
Salary reviews for all health 
professionals; Call allowances- 
better rates in rural than urban 
areas; dual practice; part-time 
work in non-health sector. 
Source: Dambisya, “Review of Non-Financial Incentives” 
 
 
3.4.4 However, the pull factors are extremely strong and health workers remain 
very dissatisfied with existing conditions.  Multi-lateral codes such as the 2003 
Commonwealth Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Workers 
signed by all Commonwealth countries do not appear to be having any significant 
impact.   
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3.4.5 In terms of health professionals there has been an important and welcome 
policy shift away from the early reactive ad hoc policy responses to the development 
of more comprehensive strategic responses which seek to manage the mobility of 
health professionals.  The elements of this strategy include: 
 
 Improving the existing lack of knowledge and data to monitor flows of health 
professionals into and out of SADC demands immediate attention.  Improved 
monitoring systems need to be established to track the flows of SADC health 
professionals overseas and of foreign health professionals entering the region as 
well as intra-regional flows. 
 Bilateral agreements with individual countries involving codes of practice for 
recruitment and treatment of health workers, exchange programs for training 
and development and the provision of health professionals from specific 
countries.  South Africa now has such an agreement with the UK for example.  
These agreements would allow SADC countries to fill some of the gaps in the 
health service with doctors from countries which have an excess. However, most 
bilateral agreements to date only appear to apply to doctors and not other areas 
of health work which have been affected by emigration (e.g., nursing). 
 A SADC-wide policy on the movement of health professionals within the region 
to discourage movement from the poorest and neediest countries to those which 
are relatively well-endowed. 
 Skills import through return migration programmes and immigration policies 
that would facilitate import of foreign medical skills on a temporary basis from 
developed countries and from Asia. 
4.0 Policies and Frameworks 
 
The ILO has argued that “Current migration patterns, which mostly reflect 
individual or family initiatives, are in marked contrast to the 1950s and 1960s, 
when a significant proportion of migration took place under the aegis of bilateral 
agreements between governments. Today, most labour migration policies are 
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unilateral, with destination countries announcing programmes to admit migrants 
without seeking to conclude an accord with sending nations” (ILO 2004: 4)  In terms 
of migration management, the ILO maintains that there was a shift in the later half of 
the twentieth century from bilaterialism to unilateralism in migration management. 
At the same time, managing migration is seen as “inherently a multilateral issue.”  
The majority of cross-border movements still occur within regional blocs. As a 
result, there is considerable value to “regional accords and processes for managing 
migration.”    
 
This section of the paper examines the main features of labour migration strategies 
and policies and legislative and regulatory frameworks in countries covered by the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC).  Southern Africa represents an 
interesting case study in the competing pressures for unilateralism, bilateralism and 
multi-lateralism in the search for workable labour migration policies and strategies 
and legislative and regulatory frameworks. 
 
4.1 Unilateralism and Southern African Migration Legislation50 
 
4.1.1 All SADC countries have their own national immigration/migration 
legislation and regulations.  This legislation is the pre-eminent determinant of terms 
and conditions of access of labour migrants (either as temporary migrants or 
permanent residents) to national labour markets.  The majority of the SADC 
countries’ laws on immigration use an integrated system to grant permission for 
temporary employment, where the regulation of a person’s right to enter and reside 
in the country is combined with the regulation of the right to work.  Sometimes, 
persons who are granted a temporary residence permit for a purpose other than 
employment may also be granted permission to work.  Certainly, many persons who 
are granted a temporary resident permit for a purpose other than employment do 
work without authorization.   
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4.1.2 At least five SADC countries have separate legislation granting employment 
permits:  Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Mauritius, and Mozambique.  In Botswana, 
the Employment of Non-Citizens Act 11 of 1981 governs employment permits.  In 
the DRC, separate laws govern general immigration and specific work permits.  In 
Lesotho, the Department of Labour administers work permits in terms of its 
legislation.  In Mauritius, the Non-Citizens Employment Restriction Act governs 
employment permits.  In Mozambique, Law 25/99 and 26/99 govern work visas. 
 
4.1.3 Even where there is no separate legislation, there may be involvement by a 
separate institution in decisions regarding employment permits.  In Botswana, the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and Labour is a combined ministry.  Nonetheless, a 
separate internal section of this Ministry deals with the administration of 
employment permits.  In Swaziland, employment permits are decided upon with the 
help of the Ministry of Enterprise and Employment.  Likewise, the Department of 
Labour is formally and specifically involved in several aspects of the issuance of 
work permits in terms of the Immigration Act (South Africa).   
 
4.1.4 Few multilateral international instruments appear to be incorporated or 
used to any great extent in the migration legislation of the countries of SADC.51   
This is in contrast to the refugee law regimes, where international instruments are 
depended upon heavily.    Table 22 describes the substantive policies used in the 
granting of temporary employment permits in the SADC countries.  This table uses 
five factors that are commonly part of  domestic labour market policy to regulate the 
employment of foreign workers:  (i) the effect on domestic employment; (ii) the 
condition of pre-entry engagement for employment; (iii) the limitation of a permit 
to a specific employer; (iv) the condition that the worker be paid a prevailing wage; 
and (v) the condition that the employer undertake specific training arrangements.  
In addition, some countries have the authority to limit the geographic area of the 
employment permit (e.g. Lesotho, Malawi). 
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Table 22:  Temporary Employment Conditions in SADC 
 Employment Permit Factors 
Botswana Effect on domestic employment; 
Employer training arrangements; 
Lesotho Effect on social and economic interests of residents in area 
where alien is to sojourn; 
Specific employment sectors approved by Minister 
Malawi Limitation to geographical area; limitation to specific 
occupation; limitation to specific employer; 
 
Policy on Employment Permit Guide (for time posts):  
factors are qualifications as compared with advert, 
experience, relative importance of post in organization, 
availability of local expertise, period of stay of expatriate if 
renewed, local advert process, and remuneration package.  
Mauritius Specific employer limitation; 
External application; 
Limit of three years for skilled workers; 
Mozambique Laws 25/99 and Laws 26/99 
Namibia Sufficient qualifications; 
Insufficient number of domestic workers; 
Application to Immigrant Selection Board 
South Africa Quota work permit (s 19(1)):  category as prescribed, quota 
available; 
General work permit (s 19(2)):  diligent search for domestic 
workers, prevailing wage, notification on change of position; 
Intra-company transfer work permit (s 19(5)):  financial 
guarantees of deportation costs, certified need for foreigner, 
specific employer limitation 
Corporate work permit. 
Swaziland Specific employer limitation with exceptions for sectors 
including trade, business, and professions; 
Specification of steps to engage domestic workers; 
Requirement for effective training programmes 
Tanzania Specific employer limitation (s 20):  USD 500 
Specific sectors including trade, business, and professions (s 
19):  USD 1500 (large capital investors), USD 500 (small 
cap), or USD 50 (peasants) 
Zambia Professional qualification or financial resources; 
Insufficient number of domestic workers; 
Benefit to inhabitants generally 
Zimbabwe Specific employer and employment limitation 
Source: Klaaren and Rutinwa “Harmonization.” 
 
 
4.1.5 Most SADC countries explicitly take into account the effect of expatriate 
employment on domestic workers (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South 
Africa, Swaziland, and Zambia).  This may be done either directly through the 
consideration of domestic employment as a factor in the decision to grant the work 
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permit or indirectly through a requirement of diligent search for (South Africa) or 
advertisement for (Malawi) local workers.  A number of countries specify that 
training arrangements for local workers are either positive factors or requirements 
(Botswana, Swaziland).  Other countries may consider this factor in their general 
discretion.  A requirement that a prevailing wage be paid is a factor only in South 
Africa.  A few countries of the SADC region have a specific employer limitation as 
part of their employment permit (Malawi, Swaziland, Zimbabwe).  Others require 
notification for a change in employment (South Africa). 
 
 4.1.6 As the major destination country for migrant workers in SADC, the new 
South African immigration legislation is of some interest as an example of renewed 
unilateralism. The new Immigration Act of 2002 (Act 13) was amended in 2004 by 
the Immigration Amendment Act (IAA) (Act 19).  The Act conceives of most labour 
migrants, including skilled migrants, as temporary residents or “sojourners.” A 
number of different permit categories have been designed to facilitate the entry of 
“sojourners.” These include (a) four different categories of work permit (quota, 
general, exceptional skills and intra-company transfer), (b) corporate permits; (c) 
business permits; (d) study and exchange permits, which allow limited work activity 
under highly restrictive conditions; and (e) treaty permits. Other entry permits 
include (f) visitor’s permits; (g) cross-border passes; and (h) relatives’ permits.   
These explicitly prohibit work, although (f) and (g) do allow the conduct of business, 
including trade.   
 
4.1.7 In the case of quota work permits, categories and quotas are to be 
“determined by the Minister at least annually … after consultations with the 
Ministers of Labour and Trade and Industry” (Section 19(1)).   The quotas (as 
presented on 24 February 2003) related to experience and training rather than 
sectors of the economy. They were extremely broad in scope. The highest quota, of 
90,000 permits, is provided to two categories: (a) where employers “justifiably” 
require a post-graduate degree and at least 5 years of professional experience; and 
(b) where employers “justifiably” require at least 5 years of experience showing 
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skills acquired through training. A second quota of 75,000 permits is provided (a) 
where employers require a graduate degree and 5 years of professional experience; 
and (b) where employers require at least 5 years of experience showing 
entrepreneurship, craftsmanship or management skills. In between is a sliding scale 
of qualifications, skills and experience level. There are ten categories in all, most 
allocated a quota of 70,000 permits, giving a total of 740,000 quota permits per 
annum. None of the categories allow residence rights for families of permit-holders.   
 
4.1.8 Since 2003, there has been a dramatic revision of the Quota permit system 
and reduction in the number of Quota permits available. The Quota Schedule 
published by the Department of Home Affairs in 2007 allows for a total of only 
30,200 permits which are tied to specified sectors and professions.   Each quota 
category requires the person to be “registered with the relevant professional body 
where applicable” and to have “at least 5 years relevant experience.”  The three 
largest sectors cited are: “Building and engineering technicians” (5,250); 
“Biomedical engineers and technicians” (5,000) and “Agricultural and science 
technicians” (5,000).  
 
4.1.9 General work permits (Section 19(2)) may be issued to migrants who do not 
fall within the ambit of the quota permit system. Here the onus falls on the employer 
to demonstrate that they have first diligently searched for a qualified South African 
candidate and to give an undertaking that the terms and conditions of employment 
are not “inferior to those prevailing in the relevant market segment for citizens, 
taking into account applicable collective bargaining agreements and other 
applicable standards.” The general work permit appears to be a catch-all for 
individuals who do not fall under the other categories. Holders of general work 
permits are expected to provide proof within six months of issue that they are still 
employed and of the conditions of their employment.  
 
4.1.10 Exceptional skills work permits (Section 19 (4)) are issued to individuals of 
extraordinary (but as yet undefined) skills and qualifications. This is the only 
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category of work permit to include residence rights for the permit-holders 
immediate family. There is no indication as yet whether family members will be 
permitted to work. In any event, this category is unlikely to attract a large number of 
applicants. 
 
4.1.11 Intra-company transfer permits (Section 19 (5)) initially permitted a 
company to bring a foreign employee into the South African branch plant for a 
period of up to two years, but this is in the process of being amended in a recent 
Immigration Amendment Bill, which will extend this period to four years. No rights 
of family residence are provided for.  
 
4.1.12 Corporate permits “may be issued to a corporate applicant who may conduct 
work for such corporate applicant.” This is effectively a “block” or “group” permit 
allocated to an employer rather than individual employees. In granting such a 
permit, Home Affairs must first consult with Labour and Trade and Industry to 
determine the number of foreign employees who can be hired under the permit. 
Management of the permit, including allocation of individual permits, becomes the 
responsibility of the corporation. 
 
4.1.13 Visitors’ permits and cross-border passes (for people from neighbouring 
countries with a common border who do not hold passports) are issued for short 
term stays of up to three months.  Purpose of visit does not have to be specified but 
work is specifically precluded. Business activity is permitted, however, which means 
that cross-border trading can be carried out legally under these permits. 
 
4.1.14 In summary, three points need to be made about South Africa’s new 
framework for admission of migrant workers:  
(a) the new amended Act, which proposes to use migration as a tool of 
economic growth, represents a significant break from the control-oriented 
mindset of the past;  
52 | P a g e  
 
(b) the Act facilitates temporary entry or varying periods of time but does 
not encourage permanent immigration;  
(c) the Act does not encourage family members to accompany labour 
migrants to South Africa.   
 
4.1.15 The new framework also, in effect, asserts the right of South Africa to craft its 
own immigration policy in the national interest. The primacy of unilateralism as a 
principle of migration management has therefore been established and entrenched 
by the Immigration Act. In that sense, South Africa could be seen as simply another 
example to confirm the ILO’s observation about the growing importance of 
unilateralism in national immigration policy. 
 
4.1.16 Since so much SADC migration is intra-regional, it is important to also be 
aware of exit procedures and regulations.  There generally relatively light regulation 
of departures from SADC countries of both citizens and non-citizens.   In general, the 
kind of action that is required is merely the production of a valid passport or travel 
document, filling in a report of departure, and affecting the departure through a 
mandated port of entry.   In a couple of countries, the departure of persons appears 
to be largely unregulated (Lesotho and Tanzania).  In Zimbabwe, however, the 
departure of persons is highly regulated with five separate sections of the migration 
legislation devoted to the process of examining and permitting departures.  Like 
many other SADC countries, Zimbabwe follows the norm in regulating departure 
within the ambit of its principal immigration legislation.  However, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Namibia and Swaziland use legislation additional to the principal 
immigration legislation to regulate departure. 
 
4.1.17 The principal exception to the norm is Malawi where the African Emigration 
and Immigration Workers Act 1 of 1954 aims, in part, to control the emigration of 
workers (essentially to South Africa).  The Act requires adult males to have identity 
certificates authorizing them to leave Malawi (s 4); women may accompany or have 
their own certificate.  To the extent that the Act is implemented with women having 
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a migration status dependent upon that of specific men, it presents the opportunity 
for restricting the freedom of movement of women.  This Act worked with and 
facilitated the operation of the bilateral labour agreement between Malawi and 
South Africa.   
 
4.1.18 There is a fair amount of variation in the permanent residence policies of the 
SADC region.  One country, Swaziland, does not even have this category of 
immigration status at all.  Where the category exists, it is possible to distinguish two 
models. First, there is a model that treats permanent residence as an extension of 
temporary status.  In a number of countries, the category of permanent resident is 
barely distinguished, if at all, from temporary resident:  Mauritius, Tanzania, and 
Zambia.  In two countries (Botswana and Namibia), the decisions about permanent 
resident permits are made by an independent and specialized entity:  the 
Immigrants Selection Board.  However, in Namibia, the Immigrants Selection Board 
also makes decisions on temporary employment, straddling the line between 
temporary and permanent residence.  In the second model, there is a sharp 
distinction between temporary and permanent residence.  South Africa and 
Botswana have this model, where permanent residents are treated nearly as well as 
citizens.  Lesotho also makes such a sharp distinction. 
 
4.1.19 In both of these models, the acquisition of permanent residence status can 
either be an automatic or a discretionary decision.  If it is automatic, the acquisition 
of permanent residence is usually dependent either on a number of years of lawful 
status or on family status.  In the automatic granting of permanent residence based 
on years of lawful status, the number of years varies.  In Botswana and Mozambique, 
10 years of lawful status yields permanent residence.  In South Africa, the figure is 
five (of work permit status) with an offer of permanent employment.  Zimbabwe 
also has a five year period for conversion, as a general rule.  Family reunification is 
an explicit policy in South Africa and Zimbabwe.  An explicit family reunification 
policy is likely to be favourable to women and to reconcile legal with social realities.  
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The discretionary decision is the model present in Lesotho, South Africa (alongside 
the automatic model), Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zambia. 
 
4.2 Bilateralism and Labour Migration in Southern Africa 
 
4.2.1 Bilateralism in labour migration involves formal or informal agreements 
between two states: generally an origin and destination state for the same cohort of 
migrants.  Historically, temporary labour migration to South Africa was governed by 
bilateral policies.  More recently, two other forms of bilateralism have emergedL: 
one as a response to irregular migration, the other to facilitate high level skills 
exchange or import. 
 
4.2.2 Labour migration to South Africa from neighbouring states (Botswana, 
Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Mozambique) was historically governed by detailed 
bilateral labour agreements. The bilateral agreements were last renewed in the 
1960s (with Mozambique) and the 1970s.   The treaties, which have never been 
modified or rescinded, specify a series of conditions and obligations on the following 
issues: 
 Recruitment – including the right of the private sector to recruit, length of 
contract, time between contracts, quotas, payment of recruiting fees, the 
need for written contracts, and provision of facilities for recruiting and 
processing contracts; 
 Contracts – including identification of employer and employee, home 
address, place of employment, contract length, minimum wage, in-kind 
contributions, transport to and from work; 
 Remittances and Deferred Pay – provision for compulsory deduction of a 
proportion of wages and transfer to home country; 
 Taxation – exempting contract workers from being taxed in South Africa; 
 Documentation – including the need for valid contracts, passports, 
vaccination certificates, employment record books; 
 Unemployment Insurance; 
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 Length of Agreements; 
 Labour Offices – to be established in South Africa and be responsible, inter 
alia, for “protecting the interests of workers,” registration of undocumented 
workers, transfer of money, providing information on conditions of 
employment, and consulting on the repatriation of destitute and sick 
workers. 
 
4.2.3 In practice, the agreements were used almost exclusively by the South 
African mining industry.  The treaties are badly outdated and the Malawi-South 
Africa agreement is defunct.  In the period after 1994, the Chamber of Mines lobbied 
hard for the continuation of the treaties.52   They even proposed that the treaties be 
extended to other sectors.   Despite being badly outdated, some provisions (such as 
the right of countries to have a Labour Office in South Africa to look after the 
interests of migrants) continue as before.   
 
4.2.4 In practice, the bilateral agreements are being replaced by the new corporate 
permits of the 2002 Immigration Act.    This would signal the end of bilateralism and 
the triumph of unilateralism in South African migration policy.  Yet one of the 
briefest sections of the Immigration Act, and one of the most significant in terms of 
labour migration, is the treaty permit. These permits “may be issued to a foreigner 
conducting activities in the Republic in terms of an international agreement to 
which the Republic is a party” (Section 14(1)).   The treaty permit was included in 
the Act as a direct concession to the mining industry and to ensure, in legal terms, 
that the Act did not breach any existing labour agreements.   
 
4.2.5 In policy terms, the future of the treaties themselves is therefore not resolved 
by the Immigration Act.   If the bilateral agreements are persisted with, then they 
need revision and updating. Indeed, they are so archaic that this would be an 
important opportunity to bring them into line with international best practice on 
temporary migration schemes.53 The ILO has reviewed such schemes globally and 
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made recommendations which have been applied to the South African context but 
not implemented.54   If they are allowed to lapse, then all of the other provisions of 
the treaties, including deferred pay and the ability of supplier states to protect their 
own workers through treaty agreements, should also fall away.   
 
4.2.6 The tension is really between a unilateral, state-centred approach (in which 
government has the final word on every migrant who enters) or a bilateral, 
privatized approach (in which government continues to allow the private sector to 
determine who shall enter). This issue will require some kind of resolution before a 
decision is made on whether to revise the bilaterals or bring all migrants under the 
corporate permit sections of the new Immigration Act. As part of this review, the 
relevance of protection mechanisms in bilateral treaties must also be addressed. In a 
post-apartheid era of new labour laws, it might be considered redundant to 
continue with such mechanisms.   Also, the South African government will need to 
decide whether it wishes to pursue a bilateral approach (involving negotiation with 
supplier countries) or simply abandon bilateralism in favour of unilateralism for all 
categories of migrants. 
 
4.2.7 Bilateral discussions between South Africa and Lesotho, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe have proceeded on a range of issues, including migration, since 1994.   In 
the case of Mozambique, attention has focused on the treatment of Mozambican 
migrants in South Africa by the South African police and employers and the 
implications of the Immigration Act of 2002. In the case of South Africa, attention 
has focused more on developing joint strategies to curb irregular migration, 
trafficking and cross-border crime. One of the concrete outcomes of the bilateral 
discussions between South Africa and Mozambique has been the signing of an 
agreement that allows for visa-free entry for the purpose of tourism and for a period 
not exceeding 90 days. As befits a debate between a migrant-sending and migrant-
receiving country, the priorities and concerns of both differ considerably. However, 
57 | P a g e  
 
bilateral dialogue is preferable to unilateral action, so that further development of 
this mechanism is likely.      
 
4.2.8 Further, there are regular bilateral committee meetings at the operational 
level.  The minutes of these meetings may constitute de facto and de jure 
international agreements regarding the operation of migration regimes.  For 
instance, Mozambique participates in at least three such arrangements:  the Sub-
Committee on Migration and Labour between Mozambique and South Africa; the 
Sub-Committee on Defence, Security and Migration between the Kingdom of 
Swaziland and the Republic of Mozambique; and the Sub-Committee on Migration, 
Security and Labour between Mozambique and Zimbabwe.  These sub-committees 
discuss issues such as the modalities and mechanisms for deportation, notification 
procedures to consulates, complaints against police and migration officials during 
the deportation process, legalisation of workers, and means for social integration of 
those repatriated.  In another example, there are local operational agreements at the 
Ficksburg and the Maputsoe border posts between South Africa and Lesotho.   
 
4.2.9 Various agreements have also been signed by Zimbabwe and South Africa.  
These include an MOU in 2002 to manage the employment and protection of 
Zimbabwean farm workers.  The latest agreement in 2006 includes the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) and refers to the establishment of a reception and 
support centre to be managed by the IOM. The centre is to provide support to 
repatriated migrants, security screening and serve as a recruitment centre for 
farmworkers.55  
 
4.2.10 These bilateral agreements move away from reliance on outdated treaties, 
and may be easier to implement as they are focused on particular sectors. Focused 
bilateral agreements may allow for progress to be made on matters of mutual 
interest to both parties, and are often faster to implement than trying to negotiate 
multilateral agreements. However, the increasing number of MOUs being signed by 
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different Departments with neighbouring states has the potential to create a 
fragmented approach to the management of labour migration. 
 
4.2.11 One response to skills shortages and the brain drain has been for SADC 
governments to enter into bilateral agreements with other countries outside the 
region for the supply of skilled workers.  South Africa, for example, has favoured a 
strategy of importing Cuban doctors on temporary assignments to work in rural 
hospitals.  The scheme is regulated by a bilateral agreement between the two 
governments. The agreement has worked quite well although South Africa has had 
to deal with the challenge of Cuban doctors absconding and seeking to remain in the 
country at the end of the agreed timeframe/contract. Currently, it seems the main 
thrust of this agreement is to allow South African medical students to be trained in 
Cuba.  A new bilateral agreement, signed in 2007, with the Tunisian government will 
allow for up to 1,000 doctors to be recruited from Tunisia to work in South Africa on 
short-term contracts.  These bilateral agreements are highly targeted and limited to 
members of a single profession from specific countries. Their scope is limited and 
negotiated by the Department of Health. And, it could be argued that they represent  
the back-door introduction of a “guest-worker” response to skills shortages. 
 
4.2.12 The Department of Health has signed an agreement with the UK pertaining to 
the recruitment and employment of South African health professionals, including 
the adoption of an exchange programme that allows for health professionals from 
one country to work in the other for a defined period for the purpose of sharing and 
transferring skills.  Although Britain has said it will not directly recruit South African 
health professionals to the NHS, this does not prevent it employing South Africans 
recruited through private agencies or who make individual applications for 
employment. These agreements also allow for the twinning of hospitals. 
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4.3 Multilateralism and Labour Migration56 
 
4.3.1 In August 2003, SADC Heads of State adopted the Charter of Fundamental 
Social Rights in SADC, which in Article 2, sets out the following:  “The objective of 
this Charter shall be to facilitate, through close and active consultations among 
social partners and in a spirit conducive to harmonious labour relations, the 
accomplishment of the following objectives: 
(a) ensure the retention of the tripartite structure of the three social partners, 
namely, governments, organisations of employers and organisations of 
workers; 
(b) promote the formulation and harmonisation of legal, economic and social 
policies and programmes, which contribute to the creation of productive 
employment opportunities and generation of incomes, in Member States;  
(c) promote labour policies, practices and measures, which facilitate labour 
mobility, remove distortions in labour markets and enhance industrial 
harmony and increase productivity, in Member States; 
(d) provide a framework for regional co-operation in the collection and 
dissemination of labour market information; 
(e) promote the establishment and harmonisation of social security schemes; 
(f) harmonise regulations relating to health and safety standards at work places 
across the Region; and 
(g) promote the development of institutional capacities as well as vocational and 
technical skills in the Region.” 
4.3.2 The Charter specifies that “it shall be the responsibility of Governments to 
create an enabling environment in order that objectives referred to in paragraph 1 
of this Article are realised.” The Charter entered into force at the same time it was 
adopted given that it was signed by all 14 SADC member states. The Charter itself 
makes no specific reference to migrant workers. However, there are several 
60 | P a g e  
 
references in the Charter to ‘every worker in the region’ and it can, therefore, be 
assumed that its provisions are equally applicable to migrant workers. 
 
4.3.3 A number of SADC Protocols contain provisions that are relevant to 
migration within the region.  For instance, Article 3(a) of the SADC Protocol on 
Education and Training states as an agreed objective of Member States “to work 
towards the relaxation and eventual elimination of immigration formalities in order 
to facilitate freer movement of students and staff within the Region for the specific 
purposes of study, teaching, research and any other pursuits relating to education 
and training.”  In addition, the Protocol on Immunities and Privileges allows SADC to 
issue a SADC Laissez-Passer to its officials.  Holders of the SADC Laissez-Passer have 
visa-free entry to the territory of all member states including persons holding a 
SADC Identity Card and travelling on the business of SADC.  Other relevant protocols 
such as one on social security are at a draft stage. 
 
4.3.4 Three separate drafts of protocols on the movement of people were 
developed in the 1990s.57 The first was the Draft SADC Protocol on the Free 
Movement of People which proposed a phased adoption of free movement between 
all member countries. The model was heavily based on Schengen approach and 
aimed for the phased abolition of all barriers to movement across national borders 
of SADC countries within five years.   This Protocol was rejected by SADC states in 
1997. South Africa responded with a Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement 
of People which proposed minimal levels of harmonization on issues such as visa-
free entry for short-term visitors. This Protocol was rejected by the SADC 
Secretariat which drafted its own SADC Draft Protocol based on the original Draft 
Protocol on the Free Movement of People. 
 
4.3.5 This Draft Protocol was shelved by the SADC Council of Ministers in 2001.  In 
2002, the prospects for the freer (legal) circulation of labour within the SADC were 
therefore gloomy with the Protocol sitting firmly on the shelf.  In the last five years, 
61 | P a g e  
 
however, renewed debate about the Protocol was prompted by the ground-level 
reality of growing intra-regional mobility, the need for a coordinated multi-lateral 
approach to the development and security challenges of migration and the 
prompting of the African Union.  Discussion on the Protocol was revived in 2003 
when questions related to the movement of persons repeatedly surfaced during the 
deliberations of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation.  
 
5.0 The Prospects for Freer Circulation of Labour Within SADC 
 
5.1 The Protocol on Facilitation of Movement58 
 
5.1.1 In July 2005, the Ministerial Committee of the SADC Organ considered and 
approved the Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons. The draft 
Protocol was subsequently tabled at the SADC Summit in August 2005 where it was 
approved and signed by six member states.  It has now been signed by nine member 
states:  Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe). 
 
5.1.2 In terms of its current status, therefore, the Facilitation of Movement 
Protocol has been formally adopted at the Summit of the Heads of States and been 
signed by nine member states which now allows for the drafting of an 
implementation plan. However, for the Protocol to come into effect, at least nine 
member states must have both signed and ratified it.  
 
5.1.3 The ultimate objective of the protocol is “is to develop policies aimed at the 
progressive elimination of obstacles to the movement of persons of the Region 
generally into and within the territories of State Parties” by facilitating:  
 entry, for a lawful purpose and without a visa, into the territory of another 
State Party for a maximum period of ninety (90) days per year for bona fide 
visits and in accordance with the laws of the State Party concerned; 
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 permanent and temporary residence in the territory of another State 
Party; and  
 establishment of oneself and working in the territory of another State 
Party. 
 
5.1.4 The Protocol also makes it clear in regard to this provision and those relating 
to permanent and temporary residence as well as establishment and working, that 
entry for these reasons will be governed by the national legislation of the SADC 
member state which they are entering.  Table 23 sets out the main provisions of the 
Protocol. 
  
 
 
Table 23: Main Provisions of the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of 
Persons 
Policy and 
Legislative 
Obligations 
(Policy) 
*State Parties shall promote legislative, 
judicial, administrative, and other 
measures necessary for cooperation in 
the achievement of the protocol’s 
objectives 
 
*Future policy and legislation must seek to reflect the 
objectives of the protocol 
*State Parties agree to take steps to 
achieve the following:  
 
1. harmonization of their laws such that 
citizens of State Parties are able to enter 
another State Party for a maximum 
period of 90 days per year 
 
2. abolition of visa requirements, 
provided that where visas are regarded 
as necessary they will be issued gratis at 
port of entry 
 
*Requires state parties to relinquish some internal 
control over the immigration of citizens of other member 
states into their national territory 
*Applications for residence permits and 
permit renewals shall be issued in 
accordance with the national laws of the 
State Party concerned 
*Does not dictate the content of national laws regarding 
residence 
 
*Are laws regarding Residence Permits subject to the 
harmonization provisions of the protocol? 
 
*State Parties shall, in terms of its 
national laws, grant permission for the 
establishment to citizens of other State 
Parties 
*Does not dictate the content of national establishment 
laws 
 
*Are national laws regarding establishment subject to 
harmonization? 
 
63 | P a g e  
 
*No citizen of a State Party who has been 
granted residence or establishment in 
the territory of another State Party may 
be expelled from the host state except 
where: 
 
1. reasons of national security, public 
order or public health so dictate 
 
2. an essential condition of the validity of 
such person’s residence or establishment 
permit has ceased to exist or cannot be 
complied with any longer 
 
3. a citizen of another State Party acts in 
conflict with the purposes for which such 
permit was issued or fails to comply with 
any conditions subject to which it was 
issued 
 
4. the person refuses to comply with a 
lawful order of a public health authority, 
assuming that the consequences of such 
refusal have been explained 
 
*The diplomatic or consular authorities 
of the State Party of which the affected 
party is a citizen shall be informed of the 
decision to expel the affected person and 
such person shall be afforded an 
opportunity to consult with said 
diplomatic or consular authorities 
 
*Any person who has acquired residence 
or establishment in the territory of a 
State Party shall not be subject to 
collective or group indiscriminate 
expulsion 
 
*Each case of expulsion shall be 
considered on its own merits 
 
*Each State Party shall ensure that is 
laws, regulations, or administrative 
mechanisms for the expulsion of citizens 
of other State Parties, except where 
Article 22 applies, incorporate the 
following principles: 
 
1. giving of adequate notice 
 
2. affording to the affected person the 
opportunity to have recourse in the 
appropriate domestic courts or tribunals 
of the host state 
 
3. suspension of any order of expulsion 
upon notice of appeal 
 
4. giving of reasonable time to affected 
parties to settle their personal affairs 
 
5. expulsion of any individual may not 
affect the residence or establishment 
permits of any independent member of 
that person’s family 
 
6. the expenses involved in repatriation 
of the affected party to their home state 
*The requirements governing expulsion necessitate an 
oversight body in each member state to guarantee that 
the limitations to expulsion of citizens of other member 
states are respected and that the appropriate rights are 
guaranteed to the affected parties in the case of expulsion 
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Practical and 
Logistical 
Requirements 
(Logistics) 
*State Parties shall promote legislative, 
judicial, administrative, and other 
measures necessary for co-operation in 
the achievement of the protocol’s 
objectives 
 
*Necessitates establishment of an oversight body in each 
member state specifically charged with monitoring SADC-
related issues 
*State Parties shall establish and 
maintain a population register from 
which the status of its citizens and 
permanent residents can be determined 
accurately 
 
*Requires the creation of a nationally accessible database 
containing information on all citizens and permanent 
residents 
 
*State parties must take steps to achieve: 
 
1. regional standardization of 
immigration forms  
 
2. establishment of a separate SADC desk 
at each major port of entry between State 
Parties 
 
3. bilateral agreements to establish a 
sufficient number of border crossing 
points with identical opening hours on 
each side of the border and at least one 
such post which remains opens 24 hours 
every day 
 
4. bilateral agreements to provide 
uniform border passes to citizens of State 
Parties who reside in border areas 
 
5. co-operation with SADC secretariat to 
provide senior immigration, customs, 
and security officials as necessary to 
facilitate the movement of person within 
SADC 
 
*Establishment of SADC desk requires allocation of 
funding to staff desks, however this provision may 
facilitate the movement of persons by reducing customs 
activity among citizens of member states 
 
* Creating a “sufficient” number of border crossing sites 
with identical opening hours on both sides and at least 
one post that is open 24 hours requires legislative 
coordination to establish new sites and funding to build 
the facilities and provide staff 
 
*Issuance of uniform border passes requires a centralized 
database of all citizens of member states who are entitled 
to such a pass 
 
*Requires funding for expanded immigration, customs, 
and security staff 
 
*State Parties agree to make travel 
documents readily available to their 
citizens and to increase and improve 
travel facilities especially between their 
mutual borders 
 
*State Parties undertake to introduce 
machine readable passports as soon as 
possible and technologically sensitive 
passports and other related facilities as 
circumstances allow 
 
*Requires funding for: 
1. Physical improvements and renovations to travel 
facilities (e.g. airports, train/bus depots) 
 
2. Upgrades in elements of infrastructure to facilitate 
travel (e.g. roads, railroads, etc.) 
 
3. Coordinated technological system to allow for machine 
readable and technologically sensitive passports 
 
State Parties agree to increase co-
operation and mutual assistance in: 
 
1. improving mechanisms for co-
operation in safeguarding security by 
exchanging information among relevant 
authorities on security, crime, and 
intelligence 
 
2. training competent authorities and 
educating communities on the protocol 
 
3. providing sufficient and adequately 
equipped ports of entry 
 
*Requires funding to provide for training of officials and 
community education initiatives regarding protocol 
 
* “…sufficient and adequately equipped ports of entry…” 
involves additional funding to update technology at ports 
of entry, as well as employ a sufficient staff of customs 
officers to move persons through efficiently 
 
*Exchange of security and intelligence information among 
member states requires a centralized computer database 
accessible to all member states to facilitate sharing of 
information between countries 
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*State Parties must afford to an expelled 
person the opportunity to have recourse 
in the appropriate domestic courts or 
tribunals of the host state 
 
* The expenses involved in repatriation 
of an expelled party to their home state 
shall be shared, as per bilateral 
agreements, by the receiving State Party 
and the State Party ordering expulsion 
 
*Requires funding for: 
 
1. the establishment of an appropriate judicial mechanism 
through which an expelled person may pursue the appeal 
process 
 
2. costs incurred in repatriating expelled individuals 
*In order to assist in the enforcement of 
this protocol, State Parties shall put in 
place such immigration, police, or other 
security co-operation arrangements as 
deemed necessary 
 
*Requires funding for additional immigration and 
security services 
 
 
International 
and Domestic 
Co-operation 
(Co-
operation) 
*State Parties shall promote legislative, 
judicial, administrative, and other 
measures necessary for co-operation in 
the achievement of the protocol’s 
objectives 
 
*Requires domestic co-operation to promote the 
objectives of the protocol in all aspects of government 
*Implementation framework will be 
agreed upon by State Parties 6 months 
from the date of signature of the protocol 
by at least 9 member states 
 
*Requires co-operation amongst signatories to develop an 
implementation plan, including an appropriate time 
frame 
*State Parties shall ensure that all 
relevant national laws, statutory rules 
and regulations are in harmony with and 
promotive of the objectives of this 
protocol 
 
*State Parties undertake to co-operate 
and assist the other state parties to 
facilitate the movement of persons in the 
Community as a vehicle for achieving 
economic integration 
 
*Requires significant international legislative co-
operation and communication regarding immigration 
policies and the movement of persons 
* State parties shall take steps to achieve: 
 
1. bilateral agreements to establish a 
sufficient number of border crossing 
points with identical opening hours on 
each side of the border and at least one 
such post which remains opens 24 hours 
every day 
 
2. bilateral agreements to provide 
uniform border passes to citizens of State 
Parties who reside in border areas 
 
3. co-operation with SADC secretariat to 
provide senior immigration, customs, 
and security officials as necessary to 
facilitate the movement of person within 
SADC 
 
*Requires co-operation between member state governing 
bodies, between each member state and the SADC 
secretariat, and amongst domestic legislative entities in 
order to: 
 
1. reach agreements regarding border crossing sites and 
border passes 
 
2. provide the proper immigration, customs, and security 
staff 
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*State Parties agree to increase  co-
operation and mutual assistance in the 
following fields: 
 
1. formulating policies and awareness 
programmes on the implementation of 
this protocol 
 
2. improving mechanisms for co-
operation in safeguarding security by 
exchanging information among relevant 
authorities on security, crime, and 
intelligence 
 
3. training competent authorities and 
educating communities on the protocol 
 
4. providing sufficient and adequately 
equipped ports of entry 
 
5. preventing illegal movement of 
persons into and within the region 
*Requires international co-operation in achieving 
logistical requirements regarding the regulation of 
movement of persons 
*The expenses involved in repatriation of 
an expelled member state citizen to their 
home state shall be shared, as per 
bilateral agreements, by the receiving 
State Party and the State Party ordering 
expulsion 
*Requires international co-operation to share costs 
incurred in repatriation 
*State Parties agree to co-operate in 
harmonizing travel between member 
states whether by air, land or water 
*Requires international co-operation to coordinate travel 
between SADC states 
 
 
5.1.5 In terms of the timeframe for implementation, the Protocol specifies that an 
Implementation Framework will be agreed upon within six months from the date on 
which at least nine member states have signed. 
 
5.1.6 The protocol thus defines three types of "movement" by people.  In terms, 
first, of Visa-free entry, a citizen of a State Party may enter the territory of another 
State Party without the requirement of a visa. However, the person must enter 
through an official border post, possess valid travel documents and produce 
evidence of sufficient means of support for the duration of the visit. Furthermore, it 
is specified that this is limited to 90 days per year, though the visitor may apply for 
an extension of this period.  
 
5.1.7 With regard to what the person may do during these three months, the 
protocol is completely silent. There is no specification as to whether the person may  
take up short-term employment, engage in trade or business of any sort, or attend 
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an educational institution. Given the absence of such provisions related to visa-free 
entry, it can be assumed that such visits are intended to be for reasons not provided 
for by the other categories of movement as discussed below.  The protocol also 
provides for an exemption in terms of which any member state may apply in writing 
and for good reason to re-impose visa requirements, provided that such visas will be 
issued at a port of entry at no cost. 
 
5.1.8 The second type of movement envisaged by the protocol is referred to as 
Residence and is defined as “permission or authority, to live in the territory of a 
State Party in accordance with the legislative and administrative provisions of that 
State Party."  The protocol also encourages member states that have signed the 
protocol to facilitate the issuing of residence permits  so as not to cause undue 
delays.  
 
5.1.9 The third category of movement, known as Establishment is defined as 
"permission or authority granted by a State Party in terms of its national laws, to a 
citizen of another State Party, for: 
 exercise of economic activity and profession either as an employee or a self-
employed person; 
 establishing and managing a profession, trade, business or calling.  
It is not entirely clear from a reading of the text of the Protocol, what the difference 
is between 'residence' and 'establishment', though the notion of establishment has 
within it, the possibility that persons who have relocated permanently will have the 
option of applying for and being granted citizenship in the country of destination. 
 
5.1.10 Articles 20 – 25 of the protocol focuses on the rights of individuals not to be 
removed from the territory of a member state unless there are legitimate and valid 
reasons for doing so. However, a very clear set of principles and procedural 
guidelines are specified in the event of such removal. Furthermore, the protocol 
clearly states that no-one may be subjected to collective or group removals- in other 
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words, no state has the right to remove an entire family or all the citizens of a 
particular country unless each case has been considered and determined on its own 
merits. 
 
5.1.11 Article 28 is a re-affirmation of the obligations of members states towards 
asylum-seekers and refugees, but stipulates that the management of refugees shall 
be regulated by a specific MOU between State Parties. 
 
5.1.12 Article 29 specifies that the institutions responsible for the implementation 
of the protocol shall be the Committee of Ministers responsible for Public Security 
and any other committee established by the Ministerial Committee of the Organ. 
 
5.1.13 While most of the provisions of the Protocol are relatively clear, it is how it 
will be implemented. The Protocol specifies in Article 4  that an Implementation 
Framework will be agreed to within 6 months from the date of ratification by at 
least 9 member states. The problem is that member states may be reluctant to ratify 
the Protocol unless they know how it will be implemented and it makes sense to at 
least prepare a draft Implementation Framework that member states can consider 
during the process of ratification. 
 
5.1.14 Ratification of the Protocol requires two steps (though they can happen 
simultaneously). Firstly, the Head of State has to sign the text of the Protocol 
signifying the intent of the member state to consider ratification. Secondly, the 
Protocol has to be submitted to, and adopted by the Parliament of the member state 
concerned and subsequently deposited with the SADC Secretariat.  This process 
necessarily involves that prior to ratification, member states consider very carefully, 
what the implications of the Protocol are.  At the SADC Summit at which the Protocol 
was adopted, six out of fourteen member states appended their signatures. If this 
show of commitment and priority (or lack thereof) is anything to go by, it will take 
some time before nine member states ratify the Protocol. 
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5.1.15 The adoption of the Protocol has been described as a major step towards the 
free movement of persons in SADC. Indeed, it is quite significant that after nearly ten 
years, a sufficient number of Heads Of State were able to reach consensus and make 
a decision to adopt the Protocol. However, in terms of content, much of the Protocol 
merely affirms what is already happening in the region based on either the domestic 
legislation of SADC member states and/or bilateral and multilateral agreements that 
have been signed between member states. In this sense, the Protocol does not 
represent any 'radical departure' from the status quo, but largely elevates to a 
regional level, what is already a reality in the region. This is not to undermine the 
importance of having such a Protocol, but to underscore the fact that in policy and 
legislative terms, we are unlikely to see anything substantially different in the short 
to medium term. Perhaps the biggest and most visible impact that the Protocol will 
have once it comes into effect would be in terms of the logistical mechanisms it puts 
in place. 
 
5.1.16 While the Protocol makes provision for a range of policy, legislative and 
logistical adjustments on the part of State Parties, the extent to which (a) State 
Parties are obliged to comply and (b) the Protocol can be enforced, remains unclear. 
While it is not always clearly stated, it is implicit in the phrasing of particularly the 
provisions related to residence and establishment, that these provisions are subject 
to the domestic/national legislation of State Parties. In other words, even if a 
member state has ratified the Protocol, it does not mean that its national policies 
and legislation will be amended to comply with the provisions of the Protocol. It is 
certainly the intention and State Parties are ‘encouraged’ to amend their national 
legislation, but there are no mechanisms to ensure that state parties will indeed 
amend their legislation to give effect to the provisions of the Protocol. In essence, 
any and all the provisions of the Protocol are ultimately subject to domestic  
legislation. 
 
5.1.17 The Protocol calls for various logistical mechanisms to be put in place; 
ranging from increased border infrastructure and personnel, to the introduction of 
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machine-readable passports and other appropriate technology. The resource and 
capacity implications of these provisions in the Protocol are substantial. While some 
SADC member states already have some of these mechanisms in place, and while it 
is possible for some other member states to put these mechanisms in place, it is also 
very obvious that a significant number of member states simply do not have either 
the resources or the capacity to comply with these requirements. The potential 
outcome of this problem is two-fold. Firstly, member states may be unwilling to sign 
and ratify the Protocol because they are aware that they will be unable to 
implement it as required. Secondly, even if member states do sign and ratify the 
Protocol, it is apparent that many will not be able to comply with its provisions. 
 
5.2 The Lesotho-South Africa Agreement 
 
5.2.1 The Facilitation of Movement Protocol has also been seen as facilitating 
discussions between South Africa and Lesotho over cross-border interaction 
between the two countries.    A Joint Bilateral Commission for Co-operation (JBCC) 
between the two countries was signed in 2001.  The JBCC is used as a vehicle to 
drive forward areas of co-operation between the two countries and by mid-2007, 20 
subsidiary cooperation agreements had been signed.   
 
5.2.2. In 2000, the Departments of Home Affairs in both countries asked SAMP to 
conduct research on cross-border movement between the two countries and to 
make recommendations on how to facilitate movement between the two countries.  
This resulted in an extensive report which questioned whether the considerable 
resources being consumed to manage border operations between the two countries 
were being effectively utilized and recommended the downgrading of the current 
border regime.59    
 
5.2.3 In 2002, an Agreement on the Facilitation of Cross Border Movement of 
Citizens between South Africa and Lesotho was drafted.  The Agreement was 
independently approved by the Cabinets of both countries in 2005-6 and signed in 
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June 2007.   The implications of the Agreement for labour migration from Lesotho 
need to be assessed.  One of the primary outcomes will be increased access by 
Basotho to the South African labour market.  It remains to be see whether the 
“special relationship” is simply to be confined to these two countries or will be 
extended to other countries although the SADC Secretariat has noted that the 
Agreement is consistent with the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of 
Persons.   
 
5.3 The African Union and Free Labour Movement 
 
5.3.1 Freer movement of people across the continent is cited as a key long-term 
objective of the AU, particularly as it pertains to the relationship between migration 
and development. Since 2000, the issue of migration and development has become 
increasingly important to the AU.  In this respect, the AU developed a Draft Strategic 
Framework on Migration in the early 2000s.  By 2006, this had been formulated as 
The Migration Policy Framework for Africa.  This document formed the basis for the 
African Common Position on Migration and Development (EX.C.L. 277(IX)) which was 
endorsed at a meeting of the executive council of the AU in Khartoum in January 
2006.   The AU summit held in Banjul in June 2006 endorsed the Common Position 
(AU/Dec.125(VII)).  This meeting also called for a Ministerial meeting with the EU to 
discuss these issues.  This meeting was held in Sirte in December 2006.  It produced 
the Africa-EU Joint Declaration on Migration and Development.   
 
5.3.2 Each of these AU documents, including the Africa-EU Joint Declaration, 
provide for wide-ranging sets of principles in relation to migration management, but 
these are presented as guidelines in the development of national and sub-regional 
policies and legislation, rather than de facto continental policies. Importantly, the 
AU documents need to be understood in the context of the AU founding document as 
well as the Treaty Establishing SADC, both of which make reference to the creation 
of an African Economic Community and the eventual free movement of persons.  
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5.3.3 When establishing the need for a comprehensive continental set of migration 
policies the Migration Policy Framework states: 
 
Well managed migration has the potential to yield significant benefits to 
origin and destination states…However, mismanaged or unmanaged 
migration can have serious consequences for States’ and migrants’ well-
being, including potential destabilizing effects on national and regional 
security, and jeopardizing inter-State relations. Mismanaged migration can 
also lead to tensions between host communities and migrant, and give rise to 
xenophobia, discrimination and other social pathologies.60 
 
The Framework thus sees migration as having both a potentially positive and 
negative effect on migration. The Framework identifies nine thematic migration 
areas and makes recommendations for ways policies can be established to enhance 
the developmental possibilities of migration.  
 
5.3.4 When considering labour migration, the Framework argues that it is 
necessary to establish “regular, transparent and comprehensive labour migration 
policies, legislation and structures” at national and regional levels to ensure benefits 
for countries of origin and destination.  It argues that labour migration policies 
should “incorporate appropriate labor standards” to the benefit of migrants, their 
families and “society generally.”  It recommends bilateral and multi-lateral 
cooperation to develop systematized and regular movements of labour. The 
Framework also argues strongly that the rights of migrant workers should not be 
different than those of citizens for the benefit of both, and national development 
policies, and recommends that States “incorporate provisions from ILO Conventions 
No. 97 and No. 143” and the International Convention on the Rights of Migrant 
Workers into national legislation.  The Framework also calls for regional 
cooperation at bilateral and multilateral levels to harmonise labour migration 
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policies.  In this arena it also sees managed labour migration as an integral part of 
regional and sub-regional economic integration and economic development. 
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